Category Archives: Court

VAT: Tax point of telecommunications – The Lycamobile case

By Marcus Ward 7 August 2024

Latest from the courts

In the Lycamobile UK Ltd First-Tier Tribunal (FTT) case, the issue was whether VAT was chargeable on the supply of a “Plan Bundle” at the time when it was sold and by reference to the whole of the consideration that was paid for it, or whether VAT was instead chargeable only when, and only to the extent that, the allowances in the Plan Bundle were actually used. The time of supply (tax point) was important because not only would it dictate when output tax was due, but more importantly here, if the appeal succeeded, there would be no supply of the element of the bundle which was not used, so no output tax would be due on it.

Background

The Plan Bundles comprised rights to future telecommunication services; telephone calls, text messages and data (together, “Allowances”). There were hundreds of different Plan Bundles sold by the Appellant and the precise composition of those Plan Bundles varied.

Contentions

Lycamobile considered that that the services contained within each Plan Bundle were supplied only as and when the Allowances were used, so that the consideration which was received for each Plan Bundle would be recognised for VAT purposes only to the extent that the Plan Bundle was actually used. In the alternative, these supplies could be considered as multi-purpose vouchers such that output tax was not due when they were issued, but when the service was used. Very briefly, the contention was that it was possible that not all of the use would be standard rated in the UK.

Unsurprisingly, HMRC argued that that those services were supplied when the relevant Plan Bundle was sold (up-front) and output tax was due on the amount paid, regardless of usage.

Decision

The Tribunal placed emphasis on “the legal and economic context” and “the purpose of the customers in paying their consideration”.

It decided that the terms of the Plan Bundle created a legal relationship between Lycamobile and the customer. The Bundle was itself the provision of telecommunication services when sold. The customers were aware that they were entitled to use their Allowances and could decide whether to, or not. As a consequence, consumption was aligned with payment and created a tax point at the time of that payment. There was a direct link between those services and the consideration paid by the customer.

The Tribunal also considered the vouchers point. There were significant changes to the rules for Face Value Vouchers on 1 January 2019 (the supplies spanned this date), but the FTT found that the Plan Bundles were not monetary entitlements for future services under either set of rules, so the tax point rules for vouchers did not apply here.

The appeal was dismissed and HMRC assessments totalling over £51 million were upheld.

Commentary

Not an unexpected result, but an illustration of the importance of; tax points, legal and economic realities, and what customers think they are paying for. All important aspects in analysing what is being provided, and when.

VAT: More on separate and single supplies. The KFC dip pot case

By Marcus Ward 10 June 2024

Latest from the courts

In the First-Tier tribunal case of Queenscourt Limited the issue was whether dip pots supplied as part of a takeaway meal deal are a separate zero-rated supply (of cold food) or whether they are part of a single VATable supply of hot food.

Background

The appellant had originally accounted for output tax on the basis that dip pots formed part of a single standard rated supply with other food. However, following advice, it then formed the view that zero-rating applied to these pots and submitted a claim for overpaid output tax. HMRC agreed to repay the VAT claimed.

Subsequently, a further claim as made on a similar basis for a later period. This was considered by a different officer who refused to make the repayment on the basis that there was no separate supply of the dip pots. This called into question whether the payment of the initial claim was correct. The officer considered the previous repayment to have been incorrect and issued assessments in order to recover the amount which had been repaid.

Queenscourt now appealed both against the decision to refuse the repayment claimed in the second error correction notice and also against the recovery assessment relating to the first error correction notice. Moreover, the recovery assessments are invalid as there has been no change in circumstances and no new facts have come to light since HMRC agreed to repay the tax. Alternatively, it argues that HMRC are prevented from recovering the tax, either on the basis of legitimate expectation or estoppel by convention, in each case arising as a result of HMRC’s original agreement that that tax should be repaid.

Decision

The appeal was dismissed.

On the dip point issue, the FTT stated that it was unlikely the dip would be eaten on its own, or as an end in itself, unlike the coleslaw or cookie elements – It is a means of better enjoying the hot food. Consequently, it is an element of a standard rated single composite supply of hot takeaway food.
Legitimate expectation – Whilst the Tribunal did have jurisdiction to consider arguments based on legitimate expectation in the context of an appeal against a recovery assessment, it is not in this case sufficiently unfair for HMRC to resile from their initial acceptance of the claim made in the first error correction notice and to apply the correct tax treatment.
Estoppel – HMRC is not estopped from making or relying on their recovery assessments as there has been no detrimental reliance on the original position taken by HMRC in connection with any subsequent mutual dealings.

Commentary

It is difficult to see the end of single/multiple supply cases, as my previous articles consider:

Here, here, here, here, and how to categorise a supply here.

VAT: Are cosmetic skin treatments exempt medical care? The Skin Science case

By Marcus Ward 8 May 2024

Latest from the courts

In the First Tier Tribunal (FTT) case of Gillian Graham T/A Skin Science the issue was whether certain cosmetic skin treatments were exempt via The VAT Act 1994, Schedule 9, Group 7, item 1 which covers services for the primary purpose of protecting, restoring or maintaining health: “medical care”

Were the services provided by Skin Science (SS) medical care?

Background

SS ran a clinic at 10 Harley Street, London and Ms Graham was a Registered General Nurse (RGN).

As an RGN the Appellant must submit revalidation every three years to the Nursing & Midwifery Council. The revalidation process requires her to demonstrate evidence of the scope of her professional practice including; evidence of hours worked, case studies, discussions with other medical professionals to obtain feedback and attending training courses. The Appellant’s realm of practice is disorders of the skin.

Patients generally attend the Appellant’s clinic by choice and are not referred to the Appellant by a doctor or psychologist. Some clients might see the Appellant following referrals from beauticians who may be unable to carry out treatments for certain conditions.

The treatments that the Appellant provides to her patients are not generally part of a treatment plan which involves other health professionals. SS could not confirm whether psychiatrists, psychological professionals or doctors would prescribe fillers or toxin for the conditions that she diagnoses.

A range of treatments were provided, including:

Restylane
Pix Cannula
Teosyal light filling
Muscle relaxing injections
Dermal roller
Glycolic Acid Peel
TCA Peel
Botox
Belotero Volume
Dermal fillers
Face lift by injection
Hollywood Eye Magic Serum
Belotero injections

SS provided a description of each treatment to the Tribunal.

The appellant also prescribed medicines such as; Lidocaine, Botulinum, Scleremo, Zinerate and Tretinoin.

Contentions

SS argued that the supplies of skin care treatments are exempt from VAT as they are supplies of medical care. She diagnoses recognised medical conditions, provides treatment to address those conditions and is fully qualified to do so. As all of her treatments are aimed at treating or curing those recognised medical conditions, they inevitably have a therapeutic purpose. Although they may improve the appearance of the patients and in some cases be regarded as inherently cosmetic, this is consequential as the primary purpose is to address an underlying medical condition whether physical or psychological or both. Moreover, purpose should be determined by a medical professional and not by HMRC.

HMRC contended that these supplies were standard rated (causing SS to become VAT registered) as they did not have the primary purpose of protecting, restoring or maintaining health as they were overwhelmingly cosmetic and so do not satisfy the requirements of the exemption.

Decision

It was noted that the concept of the “provision of medical care” does not include medical interventions carried out for a purpose other than that of diagnosing, treating and in so far as possible, curing diseases or health disorders and it is the purpose of the medical intervention rather than merely the qualifications of the person providing it that is key.

Health problems may be psychological, they are not limited to physical problems. Where treatment is for purely cosmetic reasons it cannot be within the exemption. Where, however, the purpose of the treatment is to treat or provide care for persons who as a result of illness, injury or a congenital physical impairment are in need of plastic surgery or other cosmetic treatment then this may fall within the concept of medical care.

The Appellant is not a psychological professional under Item 1(c) of Group 7 (health professionals) or a psychiatrist under Item 1(a) (medical practitioners), so the focus must be on what is within the scope of an RGN’s profession. The judge found that the Appellant had not proven her case that diagnosing and treating conditions which are psychological is within the scope of her profession as an RGN.

The decision was that the treatments were not for the primary purpose of protecting, restoring or maintaining health and so not “medical care” and consequently the appeal was dismissed.

A parallel outcome to a similar case in the Skin Clinics Ltd case. Other cases on medical exemption here, here and here.

Commentary

There has been an ongoing debate as to what constitutes medical care. Over 20 years ago I was advising a large London clinic on this very point and much turned on whether patients’ mental health was improved by undergoing what many would regard as cosmetic procedures. We were somewhat handicapped in our arguments by the fact that many of the patients were lap dancers undergoing breast augmentation on the direction of the owner of the club…

It is crucial to apply the above tests to any medical services to determine whether they come within the exemption.

It is worth remembering that not all services provided by a medically registered practitioner are exempt. The question of whether the medical care exemption is engaged in any given case will turn on the particular facts.

Tax points and VAT groups – The Prudential Assurance Company Ltd CoA case

By Marcus Ward 11 April 2024

Latest from the courts

In the The Prudential Assurance Company Limited (Pru) Court of Appeal (CoA) case the issues were the “difficult” questions in respect of the relationship between the VAT grouping rules and the time of supply (tax point) legislation. Is VAT is applicable on a continuous supply of services where these services were supplied while the companies were VAT grouped, but invoices were issued after the supplier left the VAT group?

Background

Pru was at the relevant time carrying on with-profits life and insurance business. Silverfleet Capital Limited (Silverfleet) provided Pru with investment management services. Under an agreement dated 30 August 2002, the consideration which Silverfleet received for its services comprised a management fee calculated by reference to the amount of investments made during the period in which services were provided and performance fees, payable in the event that the performance of certain funds exceeded a set benchmark rate of return.

When Silverfleet was rendering its investment management services, Pru was the representative member of a VAT group of which Silverfleet was also a member. However, in 2007 a management buy-out was effected, as a result of which Silverfleet ceased to be a member of Pru’s VAT group. It also ceased to provide management services to Pru.

During 2014 and 2015, the hurdle rate set under the 2002 agreement was passed. Silverfleet accordingly invoiced Prudential at various dates between 2015 and 2016 for fees totalling £9,330,805.92 (“the Performance Fees”) plus VAT at 20%.

The Issues

The CoA considered whether the Performance Fees are subject to VAT.

The First-tier Tribunal (FTT) decided the point in favour of Pru. However, HMRC succeeded in an appeal to the Upper Tribunal (UT). In a decision that decision, the UT concluded that VAT was chargeable on the Performance Fees.

In its decision, the FTT queried whether regulation 90 of the VAT Regulations went so far as to direct that Silverfleet’s services had not been provided within a VAT group and had been “supplied in the course or furtherance of a business that in the VAT group world was not being carried on”. Further, the FTT was “unable to see what feature distinguishes [Prudential’s] case from that of the taxpayer in [B J Rice & Associates v Customs and Excise Commissioners]”.

In contrast, the UT considered that, pursuant to regulation 90 of the VAT Regulations, Silverfleet’s services were to be treated as having been supplied when invoiced and, hence, at a time when Silverfleet and Prudential were no longer members of the same VAT group. That being so, section 43 of VATA 1994 was not, in the UT’s view, in point. The UT also considered that the FTT had erred in regarding itself as bound by B J Rice & Associates v Customs and Excise Commissioners [1996] STC 581 (“B J Rice”) to allow the appeal. Unlike Mr Rice, the UT said in its decision, Silverfleet “was not entirely outside the scope of VAT when the Services were rendered, but rather it was subject to a specific set of assumptions and disregards”.

Pru contended that Silverfleet should not be considered to have made the supply in the course or furtherance of any business carried on by it. The business will instead be assumed to have been carried on by Pru. This was important because if VAT was applicable to the services Pru would not be in a position to recover it (in full at least) due to partial exemption which represented a large VAT cost.

Unsurprisingly, HMRC considered that output tax was due because at the tax point, Silverfleet as no longer part of the VAT group.

Legislation

The VAT Act 1994, section 43 lays down the rules in respect of VAT groups, and The VAT Regulations 1995, regulation 90 makes provision with respect to the time at which continuous supplies of services are to be treated as supplied for VAT purposes.

Section 43 explains that any supply by one member of a VAT group to another is to be “disregarded” and that “any business carried on by a member of the group shall be treated as carried on by the representative member”. Does this mean that no VAT is chargeable on an intra-group supply regardless of whether the supplier has left the group by the time consideration for the supply is the subject of a VAT invoice and paid? Or is section 43 inapplicable in respect of continuous supplies insofar as the consideration is invoiced and received only after the supplier is no longer a member of the VAT group because regulation 90 provides for the services to be treated as supplied at the time of the invoice or payment?

Decision

The appeal was dismissed and HMTC’s assessment was upheld. It was not possible to disregard the supply as intra-group and the tax point rules for the continuous supply of services meant that it was a taxable supply. The decision was not unanimous, with the decision by the judges being a 2:1 majority.

Commentary

This was a close decision and highlights the necessity of considering the interaction between VAT groups and tax points and the implications of timings. The case makes interesting reading in full (well, for VAT people anyway!) for the technical discussions and the disagreement between the judges.

The interaction between Transfer Pricing and VAT

By Marcus Ward 20 February 2024

Are Transfer Pricing (TP) adjustments subject to VAT? – Usually no, but…

What is TP?

A transfer price is the price charged in a transaction between two parties. The transfer pricing legislation concerns itself with the prices charged in transactions between connected parties as, in such circumstances, the price charged may not necessarily be that which would have been charged if the parties had not been connected.

The UK’s transfer pricing legislation details how transactions between connected parties are handled and in common with many other countries is based on the internationally recognised ‘arm’s length principle’.

The UK allows only for a transfer pricing adjustment to increase taxable profits or reduce a tax loss. It is not possible to decrease profits or increase a tax loss.

The UK’s transfer pricing legislation also applies to transactions between any connected UK entities.

The arm’s length principle applies to transactions between connected parties. For tax purposes such transactions are treated by reference to the profit that would have arisen if the transactions had been carried out under comparable conditions by independent parties.

So, is a TP adjustment additional consideration for a supply?

VAT

Value of the supply – what is the consideration?

TP is a direct tax concept which does not necessarily align with VAT considerations. Unhelpfully, there are no provisions in UK legislation which provides for the VAT treatment of TP adjustments. Additionally, there is no case law on this subject.

As a TP adjustment is solely for direct tax purposes, it does not usually affect the value of the supply for VAT purposes. Consequently, such adjustments are usually outside the scope of VAT.

However, price adjustments of previous supply of goods/services must be recognised for VAT market value rules only when:

the supply is taxable
the relevant input tax is not fully recoverable and
HMRC issues an ‘Open Market Value Notice’ to the parties requiring them to apply market values for VAT.

VAT Act 1994, Schedule 6, Part 2, para 1 gives HMRC the vires to issue such a Notice.

Latest

We understand that a case: Arcomet Romania is due to be heard by the CJEU on whether TP adjustments represent consideration and we await the outcome which may provide clarity. (Although after Brexit, the previous position: that the UK VAT Act is to be interpreted with EU case law and general principles of EU law has ended. UK courts whilst still relying on the UK VAT Act and its EU VAT Directive principles, will be able to deviate from ECJ case law).

VAT: Evidence for exports. The H Ripley case

By Marcus Ward 13 February 2024

Latest from the courts

In the H Ripley & Co Limited First Tier Tribunal (FTT) case the issue was whether the appellant had satisfactory evidence to support the zero rating of the export of goods (scrap metal).

Background

HMRC denied zero rating on the basis that the appellant did not provide satisfactory evidence to support the fact that the scrap metal was removed from the UK.

The requirements are set out in VAT Notice 725 para 5 and acceptable documentary evidence may include:

the customer’s order – including customer’s name and delivery address
inter-company correspondence
copy sales invoice
advice note
packing list
commercial transport documents from the carrier responsible for removing the goods from the UK, for example an International Consignment Note (CMR) fully completed by the consignor, the haulier and signed by receiving consignee
details of insurance or freight charges
bank statements as evidence of payment
receipted copy of the consignment note as evidence of receipt of goods abroad
a signed CMR document or note
a bill of lading
an airfreight invoice
an invoice from the carrier of the goods
official documents issued by a public authority, such as a notary, confirming the arrival of the goods
any other documents relevant to the removal of the goods in question which you would normally get in the course of business

or a combination of the above.

HMRC advised the appellant that it had received an information request from the Belgian tax authorities in respect of certain transactions and consequently, HMRC required information on the company’s documents in connection with the supplies. On receipt of the information HMRC concluded that the evidence was insufficient to support zero-rating so the sales were treated as standard rated and the appellant’s repayment claim was reduced to reflect this.

In these circumstances the burden of proof is on the appellant to show that it has satisfied the conditions set out in Notice 725 to zero-rate its supplies and provide documentation to show that the goods were removed from the UK.

Decision

The court noted that it was not HMRC’s position that supplementary evidence could not be provided post the required three-months period but that it was entitled to decline the additional evidence when it was provided some 18 to 30 months after the three-month period. It was clear that the evidence of removal must be obtained within three months and not that the valid evidence is brought into existence within the three-month time limit and obtained at some future date.

Notice 725 sets out the conditions which attach to the entitlement to zero-rate supplies. The FTT considered it to be clear from paragraph 4.3 and 4.4 (which have the force of law) that the onus is on the exporter company claiming zero-rating to gather sufficient evidence of removal within three months of the date of the supply. If it does not do so, it is not entitled to zero-rate the supplies.

Specifically, the court considered:

Sales Invoices – did not provide clear evidence that the goods were removed from the UK. Despite the invoices confirming the sale of scrap metal to a Belgium registered company it did not follow that the address of the purchaser is the same address as the destination that the goods were sent to.
Bank Statements – simply provided proof of payment they did not confirm who received the goods nor where the goods were delivered.
Weighbridge Tickets – merely confirm a consignment of scrap metal was sold to a Belgium based company and the goods were collected by a UK registered vehicle.
CMRs – none of the CMRs were fully completed by the haulier and signed by the receiving consignee.
P&O Boarding Cards –a taxpayer must have in its possession valid evidence of export within three months from the time of supply. The boarding cards were not provided to HMRC until 30 May 2018, some 18 to 30 months after the disputed consignments took place. It was not disproportionate for HMRC to state that the time limit for obtaining valid evidence of removal was three months and that the substantive requirements of Notice 725 had not been met. In any event, the court did not accept that the boarding cards evidence the exports of the scrap metal; none of the reference numbers on the boarding card match those used in any of the other documents and none of the lead names on the boarding cards match any of the other names in any other document. The boarding cards do not have any identifying features such that they may be matched with any of the disputed consignments.
E-mails and WhatsApp messages –none of the messages evidence that the loads were exported. At best they evidence a request from the buyer to a carrier to collect goods from the supplier’s yard and the WhatsApp messages were silent on whether the loads were exported from the UK.

The appeal was dismissed, and the assessments were upheld because none of the documents either individually or taken as a whole, were sufficient evidence to support zero-rating.

Commentary

Yet another case illustrating the importance of insuring correct documentation is held. It is not sufficient that goods leave the UK, but the detailed evidence requirements must always be met.

VAT: Input tax claim on Land Rovers. The Three Shires Trailers case

By Marcus Ward 9 February 2024

Latest from the courts

In the Three Shires Trailers Limited First Tier Tribunal (FTT) case the issues were whether an input tax claim on the purchase of two Land Rover Discoveries was appropriate when they were converted from commercial vehicles to cars, or was a self-supply triggered?

Background

The vehicles were commercial vehicles when purchased and input tax was recovered. Subsequently, they were converted by the addition of three fold up seats with seat belts behind the driver seat and removing materials which had blacked out the rear windows which reclassified them as cars. This would have subjected them to an input tax block if purchased in that state.

The purpose of buying the vehicles was for the transport of trailers to customers, the collection of trailers from suppliers and to enable personnel of the appellant to attend trade fairs all over the country.

Technical

“A Motor Car” is defined as:

“any motor vehicle of a kind used on public roads which has three or more wheels and either:

(a) is constructed or adapted solely or mainly for the carriage of passengers; or

(b) has to the rear of the driver’s seat roofed accommodation which is fitted with side windows or which is constructed or adapted for the fitting of side windows…”

Issues

The appellant stated that the vehicles were used only for business purposes. Employees were not permitted to use the vehicles for private purposes and did not do so. The vehicles were kept at the business’s premises. He also explained that the vehicles were not converted to cars, if they were cars, they were qualifying cars and if they were non-qualifying cars, the use was only temporary, and they were converted back to commercial vehicles.

Initially, HMRC disallowed the claim because the vehicles became cars and subject to the input tax block.

Subsequently, HMRC’s case was that the vehicles had been converted from commercial vehicles to non-qualifying cars which triggers an irreversible self-supply under Article 5 of the Value Added Tax (Cars) Order 1992 so output tax equalling the claimed input tax was due.

Decision

The FTT decided that, at the time when the vehicles were acquired, they were indisputably commercial vehicles and the appellant was entitled to deduct the input tax on them.

The judge found that, after conversion, the vehicles were intended for use, and were used, only for business purposes. The appellant did not intend that the vehicles should be used for private purposes and so far as he was aware, there was no private use. The vehicles were therefore qualifying motor vehicles eligible for input VAT recovery. No output tax was due on a self-supply.

The appeal was allowed.

Commentary

Another case on the recovery of input tax on car purchases and the difference between commercial vehicles and cars. It is notoriously difficult to persuade HMRC that there is no private use of cars, but it is possible.

VAT: Are freemasons’ aims philanthropic? The United Grand Lodge UT case

By Marcus Ward 10 January 2024

Latest from the courts

In the Upper Tribunal (UT) case of United Grand Lodge of England (UGLE) the issue was whether subscriptions paid by members of the freemasons are exempt via The VAT Act 1994, Schedule 9, Group 9, section 31, item 1(e) “Subscriptions to trade unions, professional and other public interest bodies” which exempts membership subscriptions paid to a non-profit making organisation which has objects which are of a political, religious, patriotic, philosophical, philanthropic or civic nature. UGLE submitted claims on the basis that its subscription income was exempt (and not standard rated as declared on previous returns) and HMRC declined to make the repayments.

Background

UGLE is an unincorporated association. It has approximately 175,000 members who, in turn, are members of some 6,500 local Lodges.

An organisation which has more than one main aim can still come within the exemption if those aims are all listed and described in the legislation. The fact that the organisation has other aims which are not set out in law does not mean that its services to members are not exempt provided that those other aims are not main aims. If, however, the organisation has a number of aims, all equally important, some of which are covered by the exemption, and some of which are not, then the services supplied by the organisation to its members are wholly outside the exemption.

In the first hearing the First-Tier Tribunal concluded that the services supplied by UGLE were not exempt from VAT. It also held that UGLE does not have a civic aim. The FTT held that if an organisation had more than one aim, its eligibility for the relief would depend on its main (or primary) aim, and if it had multiple main aims, it would only qualify for the relief if all its main aims fell within the listed exemptions. If it had a number of aims which were all equally important (ie; if it had no main aim), then all those aims would have to fall within the list to enable the organisation to qualify for exemption.

The FTT Decision

The appeal was dismissed. The judge decided that the supplies made by UGLE in return for subscription payments were properly standard rated.

It was common ground that the motives of the members in joining the organisation are irrelevant.

It was accepted that since 2000 freemasonry has become more outward looking and since then has become more involved in charitable work among those, and for the benefit of those, who are not freemasons or their dependants. That said, the judge was not satisfied that the charitable works of individual freemasons, such as volunteering to give time to a local charity, were undertaken by them as freemasons rather than simply as public-spirited members of the community.

It was found that UGLE did have aims of a philosophical, philanthropic and civic nature (the promotion of all aspects of the practice of freemasonry and charity was central to UGLE’s activities). However, it was not accepted that these were UGLE’s main or primary aims. At least 48% of payments made by UGLE were to freemasons and their dependants and in the FTT’s judgment such support remained one of the main aims of freemasonry and thus of UGLE. The importance of providing support for freemasons and their dependants who are in need is a central tenet of freemasonry – The duty to help other freemasons is clearly set out in the objects of the four central masonic charities. The evidence showed that the provision of relief to freemasons and their dependants was the more important than donations to good causes unconnected with freemasonry.

Civic aims

There was nothing in the evidence which indicates any civic aim. UGLE cannot be said to be an organisation that has aims pertaining to the citizen and the state. Indeed, freemasons are prohibited from discussing matters of religion and politics in lodges.

Consequently, as one of UGLE’s main aims could not be described as philosophical, philanthropic, or civic, its membership subscriptions were standard rated. Making payments to freemasons was more akin to self-insurance, rather than philanthropic in nature.

UT – Grounds for appeal

There were two specific grounds:

The FTT failed to address or give reasons for rejecting UGLE’s case that it had one main philosophical aim and that its activities in support of the Masonic charities were in service of the philosophy of Freemasonry, in particular the third of the three Grand Principles, Relief, and thus fell within its philosophical aim.
Even if its activities related to UGLE’s charities could be treated as an aim which was not in service of its main philosophical aim, the activities of UGLE in support of the Masonic charities fall within the ordinary meaning of the word ‘philanthropic’. The FTT misdirected itself in law by failing to apply the ordinary meaning of the word and instead adopted a meaning of ‘philanthropic’ which is too narrow.

On the first ground the UT decided that this is not a situation in which the FTT had simply failed to set out every step of its reasoning, rather, the FTT did not give reasons for rejecting an important aspect of the Appellant’ case and found that the FTT therefore erred in law

On the second; The UT accepted that an aim may be considered to be philanthropic if an organisation aims to provide relief to specific categories of persons. However, it considered that there is a qualitative difference between organisations which raise and distribute funds for identified groups of persons and an organisation that raises funds from within the members that constitute that organisation with the aim of essentially re-distributing a large part of the funds back to some of those members and members’ dependents. That cannot be considered to be philanthropic in the sense of benevolence to the world at large, a love of mankind etc.

Decision

The appeal was dismissed. The UT rejected the contention that the FTT applied too narrow an interpretation of philanthropic. Consequently, UGLE’s membership income was standard rated for VAT purposes.

VAT: Contact lens services – taxable or exempt? The Vision Direct case

By Marcus Ward 8 December 2023

Latest from the courts

In the First-Tier Tribunal (FTT) case of Vision Dispensing Limited the issue was whether services linked to the online sale of prescription contact lenses were covered by the exemption at The VAT Act 1994, Schedule 9, group 7, item 1 (b) – the provision of medical care.

Generally speaking, opticians provide two types of supply

exempt medical care; sight tests, measuring and fitting
the standard rated supply of goods; spectacles, contact lenses, accessories etc

Almost always a customer pays a single amount which covers the services as well as the goods, so an apportionment is required. HMRC updated guidance on apportionment here.

Background

The Appellant “VDL” supplies services in connection with the online sale of contact lenses and this appeal was concerned with the question whether those supplies are subject to VAT at the standard rate.

The legislation provides for exemption for medical care by a person registered or enrolled in either of the registers of Ophthalmic Opticians or the register of Dispensing Opticians kept under the Opticians Act 1989. The exemption is also extended to persons who are not registered/enrolled under the Act but are directly supervised by a person who is so registered or enrolled.

VDL is a UK incorporated company and a member of the Vision Direct corporate group. VDL has a sister group company called Vision Direct BV (“VDBV”) which is based in The Netherlands. VDL operates a warehouse facility in the UK. Goods (contact lenses and other optical products) belonging to VDBV were stored in the warehouse and dispatched to purchasers by VDL, using its own workforce. VDL also employed customer assistants, who deal with a range of enquiries from customers. VDBV operates the website visiondirect.co.uk through which prescription contact lenses and other optical goods are supplied to UK customers. Customers purchasing prescription contact lenses or other optical products online enter two contracts; one with VDBV for the supply of contact lenses and one with VDL for the supply of dispensing services. There is also a contract between VDL and VDBV. VDL is not paid a fee by VDBV, its income comprises by the fee paid by customers.

The arguments

HMRC contended that there is little evidence to support that there was advice being provided to customs by VDL and consequently, there were serious questions about whether healthcare services are being supplied. The supplies fall short of a number of regulatory requirements and that the supplies described as dispensing services cannot properly be described as professional clinical advice or therapeutic care. HMRC stated that VDL has never seen a single customer. Clinical advice cannot be delivered in an impersonal or generic way.

HMRC pointed out that:

the website makes it clear that VDL does not provide advice on which customers can depend. Consequently, it cannot rely on the website as evidence of medical care
there is no direct link between the use of the website and payments to VDL. For there to be a supply, there must be a direct link between the supplier and the recipient

VDL contended that its dispensing services are superior to those available on the High Street. Contrary to HMRC’s case, it is able to identify multiple examples of clinical advice and the purpose of its supplies is to assist in the treatment of defective eyesight. All services are directly supervised by those with the appropriate qualifications.

Deliberation

The FTT was required to determine whether VDL’s services constituted medical care and were those services wholly performed or directly supervised by appropriate persons?

It was agreed that the advice does not need to be complex or personalised to be covered by the exemption as long as it contributes to the efficacy of the overall therapeutic process. The material provided on the website was comprehensive and covered the entire process from an eye test, the diagnosis of an eye defect, and then the selection, measuring and fitting of spectacles or lenses to the supply of those spectacles or lenses.

It was concluded by the FTT that the provision of the website was by VDBV as in the T&Cs VDBV operates it and owns the intellectual property rights to its content. Consequently, the provision of the website could not be part of the supply by VDL. VDL supplied the material or reviewed its content for VDBV pursuant to a contract between the two companies.

Decision

The FTT concluded that:

the quality, quantity, and nature of the optical information on the website was such that its provision could amount to medical care, but;
the information on the website is not provided by VDL (but by VDBV)
even if it were provided by VDL, the terms on which it is made available mean that it is not part of any supply made by VDL to customers and must be left out of account when it comes to characterising the supplies VDL does make
what VDL does do is choose the correct lenses and dispatch them. There is no element of medical care in VDL’s supply
there was little evidence as to how the opticians monitored the performance of the staff so that they could satisfy themselves that their performance was of a suitable standard, so it could not be said that there was direct supervision.

As a result, VDL did not provide medical care and in any case, the services were not wholly performed or directly supervised by appropriately qualified individuals so exemption could not apply

The appeal was dismissed.

Commentary

Opticians have long produced VAT challenges since the cases of Leightons and Eye-Tech in the 1990s. Any businesses using a similar business model are advised to review the treatment of their supplies in light of this case.

VAT: Best judgement; what is it, and why is it important?

By Marcus Ward 13 November 2023

If HMRC carry out an inspection and decide that VAT has been underdeclared (eg: either by understating sales, applying the incorrect VAT rate, or overclaiming input tax) an inspector has the power to issue an assessment to recover VAT that it is considered underdeclared. This is set out in The VAT Act 73(1)

“Where a person has failed to make any returns … or where it appears to the Commissioners that such returns are incomplete or incorrect, they may assess the amount of VAT from him to the best of their judgment and notify it to him”.

So, the law requires that when an inspector makes an assessment (s)he must ensure that the assessment is made to the best of their judgement, otherwise it is invalid and will not stand.

Guidance to surviving a VAT inspection here.

HMRC’s methods of assessing cash businesses here.

Definition of best judgment

Per Van Boeckel vs HMCE (1981) the judge set out three tests:

HMRC must make a value judgment on the material set before it honestly and bona fide and not knowingly set an inflated figure and then expect the taxpayer to disprove it on appeal
there must be material available
HMRC is not expected to do the work of the taxpayer but instead fairly interpret the material before it and come to a reasonable conclusion rather than an arbitrary one

If any of these three tests are failed, then best judgement has not been employed. However, the onus is on the appellant to disprove the assessment.

There were further comments on the matter:

“There are…obligations placed on the Commissioners to properly come to a view on the amount of tax that was due to the best of their judgement. In particular:

a value judgement must be made on the material put before them
they must perform their function honestly
there must be material on which to base their judgement
but they should not be required to do the job of the taxpayer, or carry out extensive investigations

This means that the assessing inspector must fairly consider all material placed before them and, on that material, come to a decision that is reasonable and not arbitrary, taking into account the circumstances of the business. In some cases, some “guesswork” may be required, but it should be honestly made based on the information available and should not be spurious, but HMRC must be permitted a margin of discretion.

Experience insists that it is usually more successful if the quantum of a best judgement assessment is challenged.

Where a business successfully disputes the amount of an assessment and the assessment is reduced, it will rarely fail the best judgement test.

In the case of MH Rahman (Khayam Restaurant) CO 2329/97 the High Court recognised the practice whereby the tribunal adopts a two-step approach, looking initially at the question of best judgement and then at the amount of the assessment. The message of the High Court appeared to be that the Tribunal should concern itself more with the amount of an assessment rather than best judgement.

Arguments which may be employed to reduce a best judgement assessment are, inter alia:

period of calculation is unrepresentative
wastage
discounts
staff use
theft
seasonal trends
competition
sales
opening hours
client base, etc

HMRC’s guidance to its own officers states that: Any assessments made must satisfy the best judgement criteria. This means that given a set of conditions or circumstances, “you must take any necessary action and produce a result that is deemed to be reasonable and not arbitrary”.

In other words, best judgement is not the equivalent of the best result or the most favourable conclusion. It is a reasonable process by which an assessment is successfully reached.

In the case of CA McCourtie LON/92/191 the Tribunal considered the principles set out in Van Boeckel and put forward three further propositions:

the facts should be objectively gathered and intelligently interpreted
the calculations should be arithmetically sound, and
any sampling technique should be representative

Tribunals will not treat an assessment as invalid merely because they disagree as to how the judgement should have been exercised. It is possible that a Tribunal may substitute its own judgement for HMRC’s in respect of the amount of the assessment. However, this does not necessarily mean that because a different quantum for the assessment was arrived at that the assessment failed the best judgement test.

Further, it is not the function of the Tribunal to engage in a process that looks afresh at the totality of the evidential material before it (M & A Georgiou t/a Mario’s Chippery, QB October 1995 [1995] STC 1101).

It should be also noted that even if one aspect of an assessment is found not to be made to best judgement this should not automatically invalidate the whole assessment – Pegasus Birds [2004] EWCA Civ1015.

Summary

There are significant difficulties in arguing that an inspector did not use best judgement and it is a high bar to get over.

In order to succeed on appeal, it would be required to be demonstrated, to the judge’s satisfaction, that the assessment was raised:

dishonestly
vindictively
capriciously
arbitrarily
spuriously
via an estimate or a guess in which all elements or best judgement are absent
wholly unreasonably

and that this action applies to the assessment in its entirety.