Category Archives: Latest from the Courts

VAT: Latest from the courts –zero rating of sub-contractors’ supplies

By   8 August 2017
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In the First Tier Tribunal case of Summit Electrical Installations Ltd the issue was whether supplies in respect of student accommodation made by an electrical sub-contractor were eligible for zero rating as supplies in the course of construction of buildings designed as a series of dwellings. Alternatively, were they, as HMRC contended; standard rated supplies in the course of construction of a building used for a Relevant Residential Purpose (RRP)?

Background

The appellant was appointed as the electrical subcontractor working to a main contractor on a development known as Primus Place in Leicester. This development is a seven storey block of student accommodation comprising 140 studio flats and associated facilities. Floors one to six are similar in layout with the majority of the studio flats being the same size. There are also a number of larger studios on some floors. On the ground floor there is a communal reception, cycle store, and laundry. In addition management offices, stores, bins and plant rooms are situated on the ground floor. Each of the studio flats was fitted out with a bathroom pod (a unit including shower, sink and toilet) installed in the corner of the room. In addition there was a small kitchenette with dish washing sink, countertop, cooker, fridge and microwave. Through a doorless stud wall is an open plan sleeping area and walk in cupboard.

The planning permission was granted subject to one relevant condition which provided that at the development: “…no person other than a full time student attending the University of Leicester or DeMontfort University…shall occupy these flats at any time”.

The main contractor provided a zero rating certificate to the appellant. This certificate certified that the developer of the site intended to use the buildings for a relevant residential purpose, namely student living accommodation.

Technical

In this case the distinction between the construction of dwellings and RRPs is that sub-contractors may zero rate their supplies if the work is in respect of dwellings, but those same supplies are standard rated if what is being constructed is a RRP. It is useful to consider the distinction here.

Relevant Residential Purpose

RRP means use as:

(a) a home or other institution providing residential accommodation for children

(b) a home or other institution providing residential accommodation with personal care for persons in need of personal care by reason of old age, disablement, past or present dependence on alcohol or drugs or past or present mental disorder

(c) a hospice

(d) residential accommodation for students or school pupils

(e) residential accommodation for members of any of the armed forces

(f) a monastery, nunnery or similar establishment, or

(g) an institution which is the sole or main residence of at least 90 per cent. of its residents

but not use as a:

hospital or similar institution

prison or similar institution, or

hotel, inn or similar establishment

Clearly, by the above definition, student accommodation is deemed to be a RRP. Therefore, the Tribunal was asked to consider whether the accommodation would also qualify as dwellings, and if so, whether “designed as a dwelling” takes precedence. The definition of a dwelling is as follows (“Note 2” as referred to below).

Dwellings

A building is designed as a dwelling or a number of dwellings where in relation to each dwelling the following conditions are satisfied:

(a) the dwelling consists of self-contained living accommodation;

(b) there is no provision for direct internal access from the dwelling to any other dwelling or part of a dwelling;

(c) the separate use, or disposal of the dwelling is not prohibited by the term of any covenant, statutory planning consent or similar provision; and

(d) statutory planning consent has been granted in respect of that dwelling and its construction or conversion has been carried out in accordance with that consent.

Decision

The judge ruled that the accommodation qualified as dwellings for the purpose of zero rating such that the sub-contractors supplies could also be zero rated. This was the case even though the planning permission contained a condition restricting their use to students of the universities only. The building also qualified as a RRP but via VAT Act 1994, Schedule 8, Group 5, note 2 – designed as a dwelling takes precedence over RRP.

NB: The Tribunal also found that HMRC guidance which sets out that in similar circumstances it is the main contractor who determines which type of zero rating applies to a particular development has no basis in law. It is the responsibility of the sub-contractor to determine whether it is working on a dwelling or a RRP building regardless of the main contractor’s position.

Commentary

HMRC appeared to have relied solely on para (c) of Note 2 (above) to disqualify the accommodation from being dwellings, on the basis that the planning permission prohibited occupation by any other person than students of the universities, but the judge was having none of that. The decision was hardly unexpected, but the comments on there being no legal basis to support HMRC’s published guidance is helpful and provides clarity.

As always, when analysing supplies of construction services (plus associated goods) and transactions involving land and property it pays to get proper VAT advice. There are many traps for the unwary and the values involved are usually high.  The cost of getting it wrong can be very harmful to a business.

VAT: Latest from the courts – extent of education exemption

By   7 August 2017
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In the case of SAE Education Ltd (SAE) at the Court of Appeal, the court was required to decide on whether the exemption for education services extended to a “Special Associate College”.

Background

At the relevant time here was relationship between SAE and Middlesex University which has existed since 1998 when the first Memorandum of Co-operation was signed.  This was a contractual document which provided for certain BA courses to be taught by SAE at specified campuses as “validated collaborative programs” of the university. Subsequently the university and SAE entered into further Memoranda of Co-operation which replaced the earlier agreement and provided for the validation of additional courses. Tuition was provided by SAE subject to quality assurance safeguards. SAE provided library, computer and other facilities but SAE students would not normally be entitled to access or use of the university’s Learning and Resource Services unless negotiated at extra cost. Nor were they to be entitled to access university’s accommodation and other social welfare services or to apply for financial support from the University’s Access to Learning Fund. They were however, entitled to access the university’s Disability Support Services but again at an additional cost.

In 2010 a decision by the university to grant SAE accredited status was made. This meant that SAE was accredited to validate, monitor and review courses of study leading to university undergraduate awards in certain subjects. This gave SAE the ability to validate the specified programmes itself (although Middlesex University staff continued to be involved in the assessment of the programmes).

The issue

SAE claimed that its supplies were exempt on the basis that it was a college of Middlesex University and therefore an “eligible body” (see below) and that the services supplied were educational as the university outsourced certain courses to it.

HMRC disagreed and assessed for output tax on the appellant’s services on the basis that exemption did not apply and the supplies were standard rated.

Legislation

The relevant legislation: VAT Act 1994, Schedule 9, Group 6, item 1 insists that in order for exemption to apply the provision of education (inter alia) must be by an “eligible body”. The matter to be considered therefore was; is SAE Education Ltd an eligible body. An “Eligible body” is defined in Note (1). It includes a long list of different types of school and higher education establishments but the appeal concerned paragraph (b): “a United Kingdom university, and any college, institution, school or hall of such a university;”

Decision

So was the appellant a UK university, college, instruction, school or hall of such a university?  The judges concluded that it was not.

It was decided that although Middlesex University outsourced certain courses to it, and that SAE  was appointed as a Special Associate College,  this fell short of making it a college in a constitutional or structural sense. In their view a college means entities which are a constituent part of an university. The example given was of Cambridge and Oxford colleges which have been organised for centuries on a federal system under which the colleges and private halls, although legally independent and self-governing, have provided the students of the university and have assumed the primary responsibility for their tuition. The universities themselves are corporations and are regulated by statute with their own separate legal identity and status. “The colleges and private halls are therefore an integral part of the structure of the university and their members make up the university’s teaching staff and students.”

Commentary

It would appear that as a result of the approach in this case, the exemption for education may be more restrictive than previously understood. It is vital that providers of education review their VAT status as soon as possible.  I would advise that a VAT consultant is used because this is an area where small details may affect the VAT treatment of the services. The ruling in this case is not helpful.

VAT – Latest from the courts: Fleming claims

By   26 July 2017
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In the First Tier Tribunal (FTT) case of NHS Lothian Health Board “the Board” the judge was asked to consider whether the Board had a valid Fleming claim* in respect of certain laboratory services performed from 1974 to 1997. The relevant services were, inter alia; Nequas work, food-testing, water-testing, non-medical testing of samples, especially for public health, and research and development.

Decision

The appeal was rejected. Although the Tribunal accepted the considerable evidence and testimony from members of staff working for the Board during the relevant years, and had decided that the relevant supplies were subject to VAT (they were not exempt of non-business) unfortunately, there was insufficient documentary evidence to actually quantify the amount of input tax claimed.  Of course, in order to recover input tax, it had to relate to taxable (business) supplies made by the appellant. The Tribunal was required to consider whether the business income of the laboratories could be calculated. The FTT considered that whilst the evidence was helpful in determining that taxable supplies were made, that evidence fell short of facilitating its quantification. While the business income was almost certainly significant, the Tribunal did not consider that it has been quantified satisfactorily for the whole period.

The appellant contended that a set percentage representing business income could be projected backwards to earlier VAT periods. The Tribunal did not consider such an approach “reasonable or acceptable” and that the timescale involved also undermined the likely accuracy of the process of extrapolation. (The Tribunal suggested that there is a need to have a verifiable percentage, calculated by reference to prime records at regular intervals. For example, it might well be acceptable in a 25 year period to have verifiable figures every five years, and if there is not significant variation, to use extrapolated figures for the intervening years).  There was also uncertainty about the Board’s partial exemption position and how, historically, apportionment was carried out.

Commentary

This case demonstrates the difficulty of making retrospective claims that go back to the early 1970s, that’s over 40 years ago! It is to be expected that certain records may be absent and HMRC has previously agreed that the required information may be established by other methods, however, a claim has to be made on the basis of “something more concrete” than a backwards projection of a percentage figure calculated from more contemporary records. The judge gave an example of evidence that may be acceptable in these circumstances.

The outcome does seem somewhat unfair given the fact that all parties agree that VAT was overpaid due to an error made by HMRC, but the level of evidence required to support a Fleming claim has to be of a certain standard to be accepted.

As always in VAT – record keeping is of the utmost importance.

* Background to Fleming claims
Fleming claims’ are claims for underdeclared or overpaid VAT, potentially going back as far as the inception of VAT in 1973. They followed the House of Lords judgements in January 2008 in the cases of Fleming and Conde Nast (Fleming) which concerned the way that the three year time limit on making claims had been introduced. In Revenue and Customs Brief 07/08, published on 20 February 2008, claims were invited in respect of overpaid output tax for accounting periods ending before 1 May 1997. Subsequent legislation in the 2008 Finance Act limited the scope for making claims for these accounting periods by introducing a new transitional period ending 1 April 2009, before which any such claims had to be made.

Is the Upper Tribunal bound by High Court decisions?

By   11 July 2017
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Upper Tribunal versus High Court

In the case of Meena Seddon Settlement which actually involved Inheritance Tax, the First Tier Tribunal (FTT) was required to decide whether the Upper Tribunal is bound by decisions made in the High Court. The FTT decision will doubtless affect VAT cases in the future.

It decided to follow a precedent set by the Upper Tribunal over an earlier decision by the High Court.

The taxpayer contended that the matter should be decided on the basis of a previous High Court decision. HMRC argued on the basis of a later Upper Tribunal decision. In normal circumstances, a later decision should take precedence over the earlier if both decisions have the same authority and have fully considered the previous judgments. However, if the taxpayer was correct to say that the Upper Tribunal was bound by precedents set by the High Court, the later decision could be disregarded as being wrong in law.

The FTT decided that it was the intention of Parliament that the Upper Tribunal was not bound to follow High Court precedents. This was notwithstanding the fact that a High Court could have a supervisory role over the Upper Tribunal in cases of judicial review. Therefore, it determined the case on the authority of the later Upper Tribunal decision in favour of HMRC.

VAT: Latest from the courts – extent of exemption for financial services

By   5 July 2017
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Coinstar Limited

In the Upper Tribunal (UT) case of Coinstar Limited the issue was whether the services Coinstar provided were exempt supply of financial services via Value Added Tax Act 1994, Schedule 9, Group 5, item 1 – “The issue, transfer or receipt of, or any dealing with, money, any security for money or any note or order for the payment of money.”

Background

I’ve no doubt that you’ve seen those kiosks with machines in supermarkets into you which you tip your bag full of loose change in return for a voucher.  The voucher can then be redeemed at the checkout against the supermarket bill. Coinstar provides this service and charges 9.9% of the value of the coins inserted into the machine.  HMRC considered this to be a table service of “coin counting”, while Coinstar claimed that it was an exempt supply under the above legislation.

Decision

The UT affirmed the decision of the First Tier Tribunal and dismissed HMRC’s appeal, ruling that Coinstar was providing an exempt financial service. The Transaction was not a coin counting service, but a service of exchanging a less convenient means of exchange into a more convenient one which was provided in return for the 9.9% fee.  This involved a change in the legal and financial status of the parties such that the exemption applied.

Commentary

Another case which demonstrates the fine line between exemption and taxable treatment of “financial” services.  HMRC’s argument here was that this was a single supply of coin counting (which is outside the exemption) but clearly, a person emptying their big pots of change into the machine did not want it to be simply counted, the aim was to obtain a voucher in return for the shrapnel (or, if feeling philanthropic, there is an option to donate the coins to charity – for which Coinstar made no charge). It is fair to observe that just because a supply may be “financial” in nature it is not automatically exempt.  It pays to check the liability of such services because, as may be seen, HMRC often attack exempt treatment.  I have recently had to untangle a position where there was doubt about whether an online service amounted to exempt intermediary service. HMRC ultimately agreed that exemption applied in this case, but that was not their starting point.

VAT: More on agent/principal – Latest from the courts

By   3 July 2017
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Lowcost Holidays Ltd

There is a very important distinction in VAT terms between agent and principal as it dictates whether output tax is due on the entire amount received by a “middle-man” or just the amount which the middle-man retains (usually a commission). It is common for the relationship between parties to be open to interpretation and thus create VAT uncertainty in many transactions.

It appears to me that this uncertainty has increased as a result of the growing amount of on-line sales and different parties being involved in a single sale.

By way of background, I looked at this issue at the end of last year here

The case

On a similar theme, the First Tier Tribunal (FTT) case of Lowcost Holidays Ltd the issue was whether the Tour Operators’ Margin Scheme (TOMS) applied to Lowcost’s activities.

Background

Lowcost was a travel agent offering holiday accommodation in ten other EU Member States, and other countries outside the EU, for the most part to customers based in the UK. The issue between the parties is whether Lowcost provided holiday accommodation to customers as a principal, dealing in its own name, under article 306 of Directive 2006/112, the Principal VAT Directive and therefore came within TOMS or whether it acted solely as an intermediary or agent (in which case TOMS would not apply and the general Place Of Supply rules apply).

Decision

The FTT found in favour of the appellant. HMRC had argued that Lowcost was buying and selling travel and accommodation as principal, however, the FTT decided that the contracts which Lowcost entered into with; hotels, transport providers and holidaymakers were clear that the arrangement was for the appellant acting as agent. The helpful Supreme Court case of SecretHotels2 (which I commented on here) was applied in this case. The main point being that the nature of a supply is to be determined by the construction of the contract – unless it is a ‘sham’ and great weight was given to the terms of Lowcost’s contracts rather than what HMRC often call the “economic reality”.  Specifically highlighted to the court was the fact that Lowcost set the prices for the holidays, which HMRC pointed out would be inconsistent with an agency arrangement. The FTT decided that this was outweighed by the actual terms of the contracts.

Consequently, as Lowcost acted as agent (for the providers of the services not the holidaymaker) the Place Of Supply was determined by reference to where the supply was received under the general rule.  In this case, this is VAT free when the services were received by principals located outside the UK.

As with all TOMS and agent/principal matters it really does pay to obtain professional advice.

VAT – Extent of healthcare exemption. Latest from the courts

By   26 June 2017
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In the First Tier Tribunal (FTT) the case of The Learning Centre (Romford) Ltd (TLC)  the exemption for healthcare was considered.

Background

The appellant provides day-care to vulnerable adults with learning difficulties (referred to as students). Both directors have relevant qualifications and a great deal of experience in providing the care which the company provides. The taxpayer provided their students with education, activities, and entertainment during working hours Monday to Friday, providing meals and, where required, assistance with eating, administering medication, and personal care. They also provided the transport to bring the students to and from their homes and the facility. The education provided was geared towards teaching the students independent living.

While HMRC accepted that what the appellant provided was ‘welfare services’ within the meaning of the Value Added Tax Act 1994, Schedule 9, Group 7 Item 9 and Note (6), exemption applied only where it was supplied by a specified type of entity. Those entities are:

1) A charity

2) A state-regulated private welfare institution or agency, or

3) A public body.

The appellant was not a charity: it was a company which ran the business for profit. As a privately owned company, it was not a public body either. The only possible category for the appellant was ‘a state-regulated private welfare institution or agency’ and HMRC did not accept that the appellant fell within that category.  Day-care is not regulated in England and as a consequence HMRC decided it is not covered by the exemption.

Decision

The FTT found for the appellant. It was noted that day-care is regulated in Scotland and it would be a breach of fiscal neutrality if the VAT treatment of day-care was different North and South of the border.  TLC could rely on the direct effect of the Principal VAT Directive and, as a consequence, could treat its supplies as exempt and deregister from VAT.

Commentary

It was a logical decision, however, logic does not always play a part in VAT…. It sought to level a playing field that was far from that.  If the decision had been in favour of HMRC the VAT treatment would have been different if the supply had been made:

  • in other areas of the UK
  • by the Local Authority
  • by a charity

contrary to EC law.

There are many businesses which provide similar services and it is imperative that they review their VAT position immediately. We can assist with this.

VAT: Is the card game bridge a sport?

By   21 June 2017
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Latest from the courts: Advocate General’s (AG) opinion* on the English Bridge Union (EBU) case.

Certain supplies of services closely connected to sport are exempt from VAT.  Consequently the EBU (a non‐profit making membership‐ funded organisation committed to promoting the game of duplicate bridge) appealed to the ECJ wanting certain fees paid to it to be exempt.  HMRC consider that contract bridge is not a sport so that output tax was due on the supply.  This view was supported by the First Tier and Upper Tribunals. So, the simple question is: Is bridge a sport?  The ECJ hearing has come about due to a referral from the British courts in reference to how it should be applied to bridge.

The AG has looked at how the term “sport” should be defined.  As a starting point, it is clear that games such as football, cricket, tennis and squash are sport.  However, this does not mean that activities which are less strenuous cannot be a sport, and the examples of archery and badminton were given.  The AG was also of the view that sport does not need to include any physical element, meaning that any activity which is characterised by:

  • competition
  • an effort to overcome a challenge or obstacle
  • results in physical or mental wellbeing

may qualify as a sport.

In connection with contract bridge; as a card game it:

  • is dependent on skill and training rather than luck
  • requires considerable mental effort and training to compete at an international level
  • is recognised by the International Olympic Committee as a sport

such that the AG concluded that bridge can indeed be defined as a sport.

This, if followed by the ECJ, means that the EBU will be due a refund of output tax declared on competition entry fees charged to its members.

The EBU has always maintained that bridge is a sport and point to the UK Charity Commission which recognises bridge as a sport.  It adopted Parliament’s most recent definition in the Charities Act, updated by Parliament in 2011, which specifically included Mind Sports in the definition of ‘sport’, stating that sports are “activities which promote health or wellbeing through physical or mental skill or exertion”.  Additionally, bridge is seen as an excellent way of improving mental acuity and delaying the onset of dementia, and the social and partnership aspects of bridge are of great benefit to those who may otherwise become isolated.

We now await the court’s decision on whether one needs to wear shorts and get sweaty to be participating in sport.

*  The most important work performed by the Advocates General is to deliver a written Opinion, named “reasoned submission”. The role of the Advocate General is to propose an independent legal solution. It is important to note that the Court is not obligated to follow the Opinion delivered by the Advocate General. Even though the Opinion does not bind the Court it has an impact on the decision in many cases, and in fact, in most cases the ECJ follows it.

VAT – Are overpayments subject to output tax?

By   19 June 2017
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This was the question considered by the Upper Tribunal (UT) in the case of National Car Parks Limited

Latest from the courts

We’ve all been there. We’ve found a NCP pay and display car park and want to park for one hour.  We find a free space and go to the pay and display ticket machine. In this example, the prices stated on the tariff board next to the pay and display ticket machine are: Parking for up to one hour – £1.40. Parking for up to three hours – £2.10. The pay and display ticket machine states that change is not given but overpayments are accepted.

Guess what? As usual, we find that we don’t have the right money and only have a pound and a fifty pence piece, so we have to put them both in the machine.  The machine meter records the coins as they are fed into the machine, starting with the pound coin. When the fifty pence piece has been inserted and accepted by the machine, the machine flashes up ‘press green button for ticket’ which we customer do. The amount paid is printed on her ticket, as is the expiry time of one hour later and we wander off  to attend our business.

So, is VAT due on the overpayment of 10p?

The First Tier Tribunal (FTT) said “yes”.  It held that the excess payments made by the customer to NCP were not voluntary because the customer was required to pay at least the amount specified in order to park their vehicle and, if the customer did not have the correct change, the customer was required to pay an additional amount in order to obtain the right to park. The only sense in which the payment could be said to be “voluntary” is that the customer could decide not to buy a ticket which would mean not parking the car and having to go elsewhere. The taxpayer then appealed to the UT.

Law

Article 2(1)(c) of the Principal VAT Directive (PVD) provides that supplies of services for consideration within the territory of a Member State by a taxable person acting as such are subject to VAT. Article 73 of the PVD provides: “In respect of the supply of goods or services… the taxable amount shall include everything which constitutes consideration obtained or to be obtained by the supplier, in return for the supply, from the customer or a third party, including subsidies directly linked to the price of the supply.”  The provisions of the PVD have been implemented in UK law by the Value Added Tax Act 1994. Section 5(2)(a) of the VAT Act 1994 defines ‘supply’ to include all forms of supply but not anything done otherwise than for a consideration and section 19(4) provides: “Where a supply of any goods or services is not the only matter to which a consideration in money relates, the supply shall be deemed to be for such part of the consideration as is properly attributable to it.”

 Decision

The UT agreed with the FTT, and so the taxpayer’s appeal was dismissed.  A distinction was made between these overpayments and optional payments such as tips (which are VAT free).  It was stated that the PVD seeks to identify what consideration was received by NCP, not whether the customer could have obtained the same service for less. NCP retained the £1.50 in return for providing the car parking and this was consequently the value of the service provided.

Commentary

We have recently dealt with a number of cases which dealt with the topic of valuation and have been successful in obtaining a refund of overpaid VAT. Unfortunately for the appellant in this case, it seems that there was little chance of success and they didn’t get to keep all of value of the overpayments. All those 10ps add up…

VAT: Latest from the courts – are services by a CIC business?

By   19 May 2017
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This case considers the perpetual difficulty of deciding whether activities represent a business… or not.

In the First Tier Tribunal (FTT) case of Healthwatch Hampshire CIC (HH) here the issue was whether HH made taxable supplies by way of business to a Local Authority – Hampshire County Council (HCC)

Background

Under certain prescribed new arrangements, local authorities, including HCC, were required to enter into contractual arrangements with a body corporate, which was required to be a social enterprise and a Community Interest Company (CIC) for the provision of various services.

These services comprised, inter alia:

  • Promoting, and supporting, the involvement of local people in the commissioning, provision and scrutiny of local care services
  • Information, signposting and advice
  • Advocacy services

HH is a company limited by guarantee but is not a charity. It is however non-profit making in its objectives, and any profits which do arise can only be spent for the benefit of the local community.  HH was formed by a consortium comprising; three organisations all of which are charities. These charities effectively carried out the work via a sub-contract arrangement and charged HH with the addition of VAT.  The issue is the VAT treatment of HH’s charge to HCC. Was this a business activity on which VAT is charged? Or, as HMRC contended, was the money paid to HH was outside the scope of VAT because it represented something which was not consideration for taxable supplies and thus non-business.

This was important as if the services provided by the CIC are deemed to be non-business, the VAT charged to HH by the three consortium members would represent an absolute VAT cost as it could not be VAT registered and therefore not able to recover the input tax.

Technical Note

Because of the special VAT rules which apply to local authorities, input tax incurred by them may be recovered if it relates to their non-business activities (their statutory activities). This is via VAT Act 1994, s33 and this legislation turns “normal” VAT rules on their head. In this particular case, if HH charged HCC VAT, HCC would be in a position to recover it meaning that VAT would be neutral for all parties.

Decision

The matter of whether HH’s activities amounted to a business was considered with significant references to the Longridge On The Thames.  Case commentary here

As a starting point, the judge commented on previous CJEU cases that it “…would seem to be a clear demonstration that simply because an activity is normally carried on by the state does not automatically mean that, per se, it cannot be economic activity”.  It was also decided that “we have come to the conclusion that HH is not a body governed by public law.”  So this strand of HMRC’s argument did not lead anywhere.

The court decided in the taxpayer’s favour; which appears to be common sense all round.  The supplies were by way of business despite the arrangements having features which may not necessarily be found in a more commercial environment (including the fact that LAs were legally required to outsource certain of its functions) . Ultimately, consideration was flowing in both directions; HCC paid for supplies which it required and those were supplied by a third party such that VAT was properly chargeable.  The fact that HCC met its statutory obligations in structuring transactions in this way did not preclude them being an economic activity.

Action

This case (and Longbridge) demonstrates that where charities, LAs, CICs, NFP entities and similar bodies are concerned, it is crucial to review all agreements from a VAT perspective. It is insufficient to assume the correct VAT treatment is how it is desired and slight differences in arrangements can, and do, produce different VAT outcomes. After Longbridge HMRC are looking more closely at similar arrangements (not limited to LAs) and we expect more of these types of cases to be heard in the future.

For more on the EC aspect of business/non-business please see here