Category Archives: Tribunal

VAT – Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) What is it? How does it work?

By Marcus Ward 14 May 2018

ADR and VAT

What is ADR?

ADR is the involvement of a third party (a facilitator) to help resolve disputes between HMRC and taxpayers. It is mainly used by SMEs and individuals for VAT purposes, although it is not limited to these entities. Its aim is to reduce costs for both parties (the taxpayer and HMRC) when disputes occur and to reduce the number of cases that reach statutory review and/or Tribunal.

The process

Practically, a typical process is; HMRC officials and the facilitator meet with the taxpayer and adviser in a room, and agree on what the disputes are. They then retire to two separate, private rooms, and the facilitator goes between the two parties and mediates on a resolution.

ADR is a free service and the only costs the taxpayer will incur are fees from their advisers on preparation and any representation they require on the day.

Features of ADR

Without prejudice discussions – Anything said or documents produced during the ADR process cannot be used in future proceedings without the express consent of both parties subject to the obligations placed on the parties by the operation of English law
Evidence is that ADR can work for both VAT and Direct Taxes disputes both before and after an appealable decision or assessment has been made. However, ADR for VAT disputes is more suited to post appealable decision and assessments
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) and a Code of Conduct – a MOU is created to commit taxpayers/agents to the requirements of the ADR process
The average time for all completed ADR cases is 61 days. This figure is from application to resolution. The average elapsed time for VAT it is 53 days
The average age of VAT disputes is eight months
An ADR Panel has been created to accept or reject applications for ADR. It screens all applications and not just those where ADR was thought to be inappropriate.
Customer / Agent Questionnaire Summary – Findings from customers and agents included:
- An appreciation of the personal interaction that the ADR process allowed
- Facilitators were even handed and impartial in all cases and kept the taxpayer well informed
- ADR was particularly well suited to resolution of long standing disputes.

Is Tribunal preferable?

Taking a case to Tribunal is often an expensive, complicated and time consuming option, but used to be the only option open to a taxpayer to challenge a decision made to HMRC. From personal experience, the number of cases from which HMRC withdraw “on the steps of the court” illustrate a weakness in their legal procedures and possibly a lack of confidence in presenting their cases. This is very frustrating for our clients as they have already incurred costs and invested time when HMRC could have pulled out a lot earlier. Of course, our clients cannot apply for costs. The sheer number of cases going through the Tribunal process means that there are often very long and frustrating delays getting an appeal heard.

A true alternative?

Therefore, should we welcome ADR as a watered down version of a Tribunal hearing? Or is it actually something else entirely?

HMRC say that “ADR provides an excellent opportunity for Local Compliance to handle disputes in a modern and collaborative way. It is not intended to replace statutory internal review which is an already established process aimed at resolving disputes without a tribunal hearing. Review looks at legal challenges to decisions whereas ADR is more suitable for disputes where there might be more than one tenable legal outcome”.

Results so far

After an initial two-year pilot which shaped the final programme, and was guided by a Working Together group that included CIOT, AAT, ICAEW and legal representatives HMRC concluded that “ADR has shown that many disputes, where an impasse has been reached, can be resolved quickly without having to go to tribunal.” And “ADR is a fair and even-handed way of resolving tax disputes between HMRC and its customers and helps save time and costs for everyone.” Ignoring the dreadful use of the word “customers”… what has the profession made of the scheme?

Hui Ling McCarthy – Barrister has reported “HMRC’s ADR studies have produced extremely encouraging and positive results – owing in large part to HMRC’s willingness to engage with taxpayers, advisers and the professional bodies and vice versa. Taxpayers involved in a dispute with HMRC would be well-advised to take advantage of ADR wherever appropriate”.

Outcome

So what was the outcome of the two year scheme? The headline is that 58% of cases were successfully resolved, 8% were partially resolved and 34% were unresolved.

Of the fully resolved facilitations

33% were resolved by educating the taxpayer/agent about the correct tax position.
24% were resolved due to the facilitator obtaining further evidence.
23% were resolved by educating the HMRC decision maker about the correct tax position.
20% were resolved through facilitators restoring communication between both parties.

Conclusion

These figures are encouraging and the conclusion that; well planned, constructive meetings, with the intervention of an HMRC facilitator, do increase the chances of dispute resolution, appear to be well founded.

Further, the fact that the project team saw no evidence of any demand from HMRC, taxpayers or their agents for access to external mediators and that there is also conclusive evidence from taxpayers that HMRC facilitators have acted in a fair and even-handed manner add to the feeling that ADR is a useful new tool.

Commentary

The comments from HMRC on ADR is (probably understandable) positive. However, reactions from the profession and taxpayers who have gone through the process are equally generous on ADR as a mechanism for settling disputes.

My view is that any alternative to a Tribunal hearing is welcome and even if ADR works half as well as reports conclude then it should certainly be explored. It should definitely be considered as an alternative to simply accepting a decision from HMRC with which a taxpayer disagrees.

VAT: Latest from the courts – Are loan administration services exempt?

By Marcus Ward 1 May 2018

In the First Tier Tribunal (FTT) case of Target Group Limited (Target) the appeal was against a decision by HMRC that loan administration services supplied by Target to a UK bank, Shawbrook Bank Limited (Shawbrook) were standard rated.

Background

Target contracted with Shawbrook to provide services related to loans provided by Shawbrook to its customers in the course of its lending business. Target’s description of its services was “loan account administration services” which amounted to Shawbrook outsourcing the management of the loans to Target. The services that Target provided covered the entire lifecycle of the loans, apart from the making of the initial loan. Target established loan accounts using its own systems, communicates with borrowers as an undisclosed agent of Shawbrook, and dealt with payments by borrowers and all administrative issues that arose. Target had limited discretion. The terms of the loans, including interest rates, were set by Shawbrook. Although Target is involved in dealing with arrears, any enforcement action would be a decision for Shawbrook. Specifically, the contract described Target as being “a provider of loan origination and account operation services” which “performs activities including the functions of: payment processing and servicing and portfolio management services”

Issue

It was accepted that Shawbrook made the loans (not Target) and that the services provided by Target were to Shawbrook and comprised a single (composite) supply for VAT purposes, rather than multiple supplies. Details of the definition between the two types of supply have been hot news in the VAT world for some time. My commentary on relevant recent case law here here here here here and here

The issue was the precise nature of the supplies and whether they qualified for exemption. The areas of dispute included whether Target’s supplies were excluded from exemption as debt collection, and whether the loan accounts fall to be treated as current accounts.

Target’s case was that the principal supply it made to Shawbrook related to payments and transfers in the same way as in the Electronic Data Services Ltd (EDS) case, which related to similar customer-facing loan administration services. (EDS provided loan arrangement and execution services to banks in relation to the granting of personal loans. The services included the provision of a staffed call centre, the printing and despatch of loan agreement documentation, the transfer of funds via the BACS system on the release of loans and the administrative work related to handling loan accounts and repayments). In the alternative, the principal or core supply relates to the operation of accounts (specifically, current accounts), or amounts to transactions concerning debts.

Technical

Article 135(1)(d) of the Council Directive 2006/112/EC (the Principal VAT Directive, or “PVD”) requires Member States to exempt the following transactions: “transactions, including negotiation, concerning deposit and current accounts, payments, transfers, debts, cheques and other negotiable instruments, but excluding debt collection;”

This is transposed into UK legislation via VAT Act 1994, Schedule 9, Group 5, items 1 and 8:

“Item 1. The issue, transfer or receipt of, or any dealing with, money, any security for money or any note or order for the payment of money. …

Item 8. The operation of any current, deposit, or savings account.”

Decision

It was decided that Target’s supplies did not qualify for exemption and they therefore fell to be standard rated. What was fatal to the appellant’s case was the fact that there was an absence of any involvement in the initial loan. Consequently, although it was possible to view the services as “transactions concerning payments” they fell within the debt collection definition and accordingly were not exempt. The judge also ruled that the supplies may be loan accounts, these did not qualify as an exempt operation of a current account.

Commentary

Of course, this decision was important for the recipient of the supply (Shawbrook) as well as Target. Because its supplies were exempt, the VAT on the outsourcing expenditure would be irrecoverable thus creating an extra 20% cost.

This case once again demonstrates that even the smallest variation of facts can produce an unexpected VAT outcome. Care must be taken to analyse precisely what is being provided. Financial Services is a minefield for VAT and it is certainly one area that assumptions of the VAT treatment should be avoided and timely advice sought.

Picture: A loan arranger (apologies)

Tax Tribunal backlog continues to increase

By Marcus Ward 26 April 2018

Both the First Tier Tribunal (FTT) and the Upper Tribunal (UT) which both hear VAT cases, report an increase in the number of cases waiting to be heard. In the case of the FTT the increase is 507 last year which means 28,521 cases are outstanding. The increase of UT cases outstanding is around 40%.

These are not all VAT cases and it is likely that the backlog is predominantly caused by

HMRC’s increased willingness to attack what they see as tax avoidance and evasion (see here)
More businesses being prepared to go to court
HMRC’s determination to “win on every point” rather than, perhaps, seeking a negotiated settlement, and
The increasing complexity of cases heard.

This backlog works in HMRCs favour as in the majority of cases the disputed tax must be paid before a hearing can take place. Delays may also cause anxiety and the burden of devoting resources to appeals which may cause the applicant to withdraw. It is not usually an inexpensive process to go to court and some cases can take a number of years to resolve.

In the current climate, it is more important than ever to challenge HMRC’s decisions. We have found that in the majority of cases we have been able to reduce HMRC assessments, in many cases, to zero. We always work on the basis that it is very important to try to resolve matters with HMRC before going to Tribunal. This is an increasingly difficult task given the political pressure on HMRC to reduce the tax gap (the difference between the amount of tax that should, in theory, be collected by HMRC, against what is actually collected) and the seemingly common tactic of HMRC becoming “entrenched” and being unprepared to shift their position.

Please contact us if you have a dispute with HMRC or are being challenged on any technical points. It is better to deal with these as soon as possible to avoid going to court.

VAT: Latest from the courts – option to tax, TOGC and deposits

By Marcus Ward 26 March 2018

Timing is everything

The First Tier Tribunal (FTT) case of Clark Hill Ltd (CHL) illustrates the detailed VAT considerations required when selling property. Not only are certain actions important, but so is timing. If a business is one day late taking certain actions, a VAT free sale may turn into one that costs 20% more than anticipated. That is a large amount to fund and will obviously negatively affect cashflow and increase SDLT for the buyer, and may result in penalties for the seller.

The case considered three notoriously difficult areas of VAT, namely: the option to tax, transfers of going concerns and deposits.

Background

CHL owned four commercial properties which had opted to tax. CHL sold the freehold of these properties with the benefit of the existing leases. As a starting point VAT would be due on the sale because of the option. However, the point at issue here was whether the conditions in Article 5 of the Value Added Tax (Special Provisions) Order 1995 were met so that the sale could be treated as a transfer of a business as a going concern (TOGC) and could therefore be treated as neither a supply of goods nor a supply of services for VAT purposes, ie; VAT free. The point applied to two of the four sales. The vendor initially charged VAT, but the purchasers considered that the TOGC provisions applied. CHL must have agreed and consequently did not charge VAT. HMRC disagreed with this approach and raised an assessment for output tax on the value of the sale.

TOGC

In order that a sale may qualify as a TOGC one of the conditions is that; the assets must be used by the transferee in carrying on the same kind of business, whether or not as part of any existing business, as that carried on by the transferor in relation to that part. It is accepted that in a property business transfer, if the vendor has opted to tax, the purchaser must also have opted by the “relevant date”. If there is no option in place at that time HMRC do not regard it as “the same kind of business” and TOGC treatment does not apply.

Relevant date

If the purchaser opts to tax, but, say, one day after the relevant date, there can be no TOGC. The relevant date in these circumstances is the tax point. Details of tax points here

Basically put, a deposit can, in some circumstances, create a tax point. In this case, the purchaser had paid a deposit and, at some point before completion of the transfer of the property, the deposit had been received by the seller or the seller’s agent. The seller notified HMRC of the option to tax after a deposit had been received (in two of the relevant sales). The issue here then was whether a deposit created a tax point, or “relevant date” for the purposes of establishing whether the purchaser’s option to tax was in place by that date.

Decision

The judge decided that in respect of the two properties where the option to tax was not notified until after a deposit had been paid there could not be a TOGC (for completeness, for various other reasons, the other two sales could be treated as TOGCs) and VAT was due on the sale values. It was decided that the receipt of deposits in these cases created a relevant date.

Commentary

There is a distinction between opting to tax and notifying that option to HMRC which does not appear to have been argued here (there may be reasons for that). However, this case is a timely reminder that VAT must be considered on property transactions AND at the appropriate time. TOGC is an unique situation whereby the seller is reliant on the purchaser’s actions in order to apply the correct VAT treatment. This must be covered off in contracts, but even if it is, it could create significant complications and difficulties in obtaining the extra payment. It is also a reminder that VAT issues can arise when deposits are paid (in general) and/or in advance of an invoice being issued.

We recommend that VAT advice is always taken on property transactions ad at an early stage. Not only can situations similar to those in this case arise, but late consideration of VAT can often delay sales and can even cause such transactions to be aborted.

VAT: Are digital newspapers newspapers?

By Marcus Ward 14 March 2018

Are digital newspapers zero rated?

Background

A long running argument has reached the First Tier Tribunal (FTT) in the case of The News Corp case. The issue was whether digital versions of newspapers should share similar VAT treatment to traditional paper newspapers (in this case; The Times, The Sunday Times, The Sun and The Sun On Sunday) and therefore be zero rated.

Arguments

The contention by the appellant was that the digital editions of the titles are “newspapers” on the basis that they are the digital equivalent of the daily editions produced on ordinary newspaper printing paper (“newsprint”). In respect of the process of news-gathering and journalism, there is no distinction between the newsprint and digital editions. Content is produced by a single newsroom under a single editor. The website and tablet editors sit within the newsroom team and are part of the journalistic process. Thus, the manner in which the newsprint and digital editions are compiled is identical until the point at which the content is laid out for transposition onto the physical or digital medium. There was, therefore, essentially no difference in the journalistic content or news teams for the newsprint and digital editions. It was also submitted that Item 2 Group 3 of Schedule 8 of VATA 1994 (below) should be interpreted purposively. The purpose of the provision was to promote literacy, the dissemination of information and democratic accountability. There was, however, a further principle of statutory interpretation which formed an important part of the appellant’s case. This principle was that legislation once enacted had to be kept up-to-date with, technological advances so that a statutory provision is “always speaking”. This was important in the present case because digital editions of newspapers did not exist in 1973 when VAT was introduced.

HMRC argued simply, that they do not fall within the definition of “newspapers” which is confined to newsprint newspapers.

Decision

Unsurprisingly, the appeal was dismissed on the grounds that digital newspapers are not covered by the zero rating provision at VAT Act 1994, Schedule 8, Group 3, which zero rates, inter alia, “newspapers” (Item 2). Group 3 provides as follows:

“Group 3—Books, etc
Item No
1 Books, booklets, brochures, pamphlets and leaflets.
2 Newspapers, journals and periodicals.
3 Children’s picture books and painting books.
4 Music (printed, duplicated or manuscript).
5 Maps, charts and topographical plans.
6 Covers, cases and other articles supplied with items 1 to 5 and not
separately accounted for…”

This relief clearly relates to physical goods. Consequently, it was necessary to determine whether digital newspapers are goods or services (which would not be covered by Group 3). It was decided that the supply in question was of “electronically supplied services” and this fact was fatal to the appellant’s case. Therefore the standard rate applied if the place of supply of the services was in the UK.

The judge further noted (on the “always speaking” point) that EC legislation contains a “standstill” date of 1 January 1991 with regard to zero rating by EU Member States. Thus, the CJEU held that the scope of zero rating provisions cannot be extended beyond their 1991 limits and that they must be interpreted strictly. In the judge’s view, to extend Item 2 Group 3 beyond the supply of goods (newsprint newspapers) to cover the supply of services (digital newspapers) would be an impermissible expansion of the zero rating provisions.

So the answer is; digital newspapers are not newspapers.

VAT – Latest on the Nesquik case

By Marcus Ward 23 February 2018

Latest from the courts

I covered the Nesquik first Tier Tribunal (FTT) case here Well, legal matters have since moved on and the case reached the Upper Tribunal (UT) recently. Nestlé UK Limited the manufacturer of Nesquik appealed against the FTT’s decision that its fruit flavoured products are subject to 20% VAT despite the chocolate flavour being zero rated.

Unfortunately for Nestlé , the UT decision went against it and banana and strawberry Nesquik remains standard rated. Similar contentions (to those in the FTT case) were advanced by the taxpayer, however the UT dismissed Nestlé’s appeal.

The Tribunal recognised that there is not currently a logical and consistent regime which applies to VAT on food (there is a long list of examples which include gingerbread men, smoothies, various types of crisps, not to mention Jaffa cakes….). I think most advisers could not agree more with the judge and I echo the comments I made after the FTT case: the entire legislation relating to food needs a complete overhaul.

Full details of the case here

VAT: Latest from the courts – Hastings Insurance Place Of Supply

By Marcus Ward 22 February 2018

In the First Tier Tribunal (FTT) case of Hastings Insurance the issue was where was the place of supply (POS) of services?

The POS rules determine under which VAT regime the supply is treated, whether the associated input tax may be recovered and how the services are reported. Consequently, determining the POS for any supply is vitally important because getting it wrong may not only mean that tax is overpaid in one country, but it is not declared in the appropriate country so that penalties and interest are levied. Getting it wrong also means that the input tax position is likely to be incorrect; meaning that VAT can be over or underclaimed. The rules for the POS of services are notoriously complicated and even subtle differences in a business’ situation can produce a different VAT outcome.

Background

Hastings is an insurance services company operating in the UK. The appeal relates to whether the appellant was able to recover input tax it incurred in the UK which was attributable to supplies of; broking, underwriting support and claims handling services made to a Gibraltar based insurance underwriter (Advantage) which supplied motor insurance to UK customers through Hastings. In order to obtain credit for the relevant input tax, the supply to Advantage must have a POS outside the EU, eg: the recipient had a place of belonging in Gibraltar and not the UK. HMRC argued that Advantage belonged in the UK so that the input tax could not have been properly recoverable. Consequently, the issue was where Advantage “belonged” for VAT purposes.

The POS rules set out where a person “belongs”.

A taxable person belongs:

where it has a business establishment, or;
if different, where it has a fixed establishment, or;
if it has both a business establishment and a fixed establishment (or several such establishments), where the establishment is located which is most directly concerned with the supply

Further details on this point are explained here

Contentions

It was not disputed that Advantage had a business establishment in Gibraltar. The question was whether it also had a fixed establishment in the UK and, if so, whether the supplies of services were made to that fixed establishment rather than to its business establishment in Gibraltar. HMRC contended that Advantage had a fixed establishment in the UK which was “more directly concerned with the supply of insurance” such that the POS was the UK. This was on the basis that Advantage had human and technical resources in the UK which were actually used to provide its services to UK customers. Hastings obviously argued to the contrary; that Advantage had no UK fixed establishment and that services were supplied to, and by, Advantage in Gibraltar.

Technical

It may be helpful to look briefly at CJEU case law which considered what an establishment other than a business establishment is. It is: “characterised by a sufficient degree of permanence and a suitable structure in terms of human and technical resources”, where looking at the location of the recipient of the supply, “to enable it to receive and use the services supplied to it for its own needs” or, where looking at the location of the supplier, “to enable it to provide the services which it supplies”.

Decision

The FTT concluded that the input tax in dispute is recoverable because it was attributable to supplies made to Advantage on the basis that it belonged outside the EU (as interpreted in accordance with the relevant EU rules and case law). After a long and exhaustive analysis of the facts the summary was;

The appellant’s human and technical resources, through which it provided the services to Advantage, did not comprise a fixed establishment of Advantage in the UK, whether for the purposes of determining where Advantage made supplies of insurance or where the appellant made the supplies of its services.
Even if, contrary to the FTT’s view, those resources comprised a fixed establishment in the UK, there is no reason to depart from the location of Advantage’s business establishment in Gibraltar as the place of belonging/supply in the circumstances of this case.

Summary

If this case affects you or your clients it will be rewarding to consider the details of the arrangements which are helpfully set out fully in the decision. This was, in my opinion, a borderline case which could have been decided differently quiet easily. A significant amount of the evidence produced was deemed inadmissible; which is an interesting adjunct to the main issue in itself. Whether HMRC take this matter further remains to be seen. It is always worthwhile reviewing a business’ POS in depth and we are able to assist with this.

VAT: Timeshare is exempt

By Marcus Ward 19 February 2018

Latest from the courts

The Fortyseven Park Street Ltd (FPSL) Upper Tribunal case.

Brief technical overview

In general terms the provision of a “timeshare” in the UK is standard rated for VAT. This is because HMRC regard supplies of this type to be similar to hotels, inns, boarding houses and are treated as “serviced flats” (other than those for permanent residential use). The appellant sought to argue that what it provided was not “similar” to a hotel or boarding house.

Background

The issue in the FPSL case was whether “Fractional Interests” (akin to timeshares) in a property amount to an exempt supply of that property. The Fractional Interests entitled FPSL’s clients up to 21 days a year in block of apartments in Mayfair.

The First Tier Tribunal (FTT) determined that here were three main issues:

The FTT decided that the supplies of the Fractional Interests fell within the exemption from VAT provided for the leasing or letting of immovable property.
However, the FTT further found that the land exemption was excluded because the grant of the Fractional Interests was the provision of accommodation in a similar establishment to an hotel.
The therefore FTT dismissed FPSL’s argument that under the principle of fiscal neutrality the supplies of the Fractional Interests should be treated in the same way (exempt) as more traditional timeshare interests.

Decision

The UT decided that the relevant interests provided amounted to an exempt supply of the property. This was on the basis that the judges concluded that the grant of the Fractional Interest was the grant of a right to occupy a residence and to exclude others from enjoying such a right, and was thus within the concept of the “letting of immovable property”. It was also found that the supply was a passive activity and not outside the land exemption by reason of FPSL having added significant value to the service despite providing; certain additional facilities, services (eg; concierge) and benefits to clients – this was not, it was decided, a situation where the appellant had actively exploited the asset to add value to the supply (which may have made it taxable). The UT also ruled that as the concierge was provided by a third party, it could not be combined to form a single supply made by FPSL thus emphasising the fact that this was a more passive activity.

It was noted that there was a distinction in this case from supplies of boutique hotels (which are standard rated hotel accommodation) because residents were contracting for the supply of a long-term right to occupy an apartment and not a series of short-term stays and that the high amount paid for the Fractional Interest brought with it certain financial obligations which are not found in the hotel industry.

Commentary

This is an interesting case and the decision somewhat surprising. There is a subtle distinction between what was provided here and serviced flats or hotel accommodation, but the UT found it sufficient to apply exempt treatment. If you, or your clients may be affected by this decision, please contact us.

VAT – There is no such thing as a free lunch

By Marcus Ward 3 January 2018

Latest from the courts

In the Court of Appeal case of ING Intermediate Holdings Ltd the issue was whether the provision of “free” banking actually constituted a supply for VAT purposes.

Background

The appeal concerned the recoverability of input tax. ING wished to recover (via deduction against the outputs of a separate investment business) a proportion of VAT expenses incurred in connection with a “deposit-taking” business. ING contended that this activity did not involve any VATable supply. HMRC contended, and did so successfully before both prior tribunals, that it is more than a deposit-taking business and involved the provision of banking services.

The issue

The relevant services were supplied to the public, and the user of the services were not charged a fee. Consequently, the essential issue was; whether the “free” banking services were provided for consideration and, if so, how that consideration ought to be quantified for VAT purposes. If there was a consideration, there was a supply, and that supply would be exempt; thus not providing a right to recovery of input tax for the appellant.

Technical

There is no definition of consideration in either the EC Principal VAT Directive or the VAT Act 1994. In the UK, the meaning was originally taken from contract law, but the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has confirmed that the term is to be given the Community meaning and is not to be variously interpreted by Member States. The Community definition used in ECJ cases is taken from the EC 2nd VAT Directive Annex A13 as follows even though this Directive is no longer in force:

“…the expression “consideration” means everything received in return for the supply of goods or the provision of services, including incidental expenses (packing, transport, insurance etc), that is to say not only the cash amounts charged but also, for example, the value of the goods received in exchange or, in the case of goods or services supplied by order of a public authority, the amount of the compensation received.”

NB: In order for there to be consideration, it must be able to be quantifiable and able to be expressed in monetary terms.

Decision

The CA decided that although there was no distinct charge to the users of the service, there was a supply of services for a consideration. That consideration was the difference between what the customer obtained from the relevant account, and what he could have obtained from an account which was not free, but provided better returns (the interest rate offered must have contained some deduction for the services provided). This was capable of being expressed in monetary terms (although it is interesting to note that the CA stated that it would be undesirable to say which method should be applied, although the court was “entirely satisfied” that it could be done).

Consequently there was a supply for VAT purposes and ING’s appeal was therefore dismissed.

Commentary

HMRC quite often argue that there is a supply when in fact, there is no supply. However, they did have a decent argument in this case and I understand that they are likely to apply this to a number of other long running disputes. Please contact us if you consider that this case could affect your business or your client’s business.

Ding Dong – Avon calling (for VAT)

By Marcus Ward 21 December 2017

Latest from the courts

The CJEU case of Avon Cosmetics Limited considered the validity and completeness of a specific UK derogation called a “Retail Sale Direction”.

Background

Avon Cosmetics Limited (‘Avon’) sells its beauty products in the UK to representatives, known colloquially as ‘Avon Ladies’, who in turn make retail sales to their customers (‘direct selling model’). Many of the Avon Ladies are not registered for VAT. As a result, their profit margins would not normally be subject to VAT. As an example; an Avon Lady may buy goods from Avon at £50 and sell them at £70. In HMRC’s eyes, the £20 difference is not taxed.

“Lost VAT” Derogation

That problem of ‘lost VAT’ at the last stage of the supply chain is typical of direct selling models. In order to deal with the problem, the UK sought and obtained a derogation from the standard rule that VAT is charged on the actual sales price. In Avon’s case that derogation allowed HMRC to charge Avon VAT, not on the wholesale price paid by the unregistered Avon Ladies, but instead on the retail price at which the Avon Ladies would go on to sell the products to the final consumer. However, the way the derogation is applied does not take into account the costs incurred by the unregistered representatives in their retail selling activities, and the input tax that they would normally have been able to deduct had they been VAT registered (‘notional input tax’). In particular, where Avon Ladies buy products for demonstration purposes (not to resell but to use as a selling aid) they cannot deduct VAT on those purchases as input tax. The result is that the disregarded notional input tax in relation to such costs ‘sticks’ in the supply chain and increases the overall VAT charged on the direct selling model over that charged on sales through ordinary retail outlets.

Challenge

The appeal by Avon concerns the interpretation and validity of the Derogation.

In particular

whether there is an obligation to take into account the notional input tax of direct resellers such as the Avon Ladies
whether there was an obligation for the UK to bring the issue of notional input tax to the EC’s attention when it requested the Derogation, and
what would be/what are the consequences of failing to comply with either of those obligations?

Result

The CJEU found that neither the derogation authorised by Council Decision 89/534/EEC of 24 May 1989 authorising the UK to apply, in respect of certain supplies to unregistered resellers nor, national measures implementing that decision infringe the principles of proportionality and fiscal neutrality. Therefore, output tax remains due on the ultimate retail sale value, but there is no credit for any VAT incurred by the Avon Ladies.