Tag Archives: CA

Beyblades – a Customs Duty case

By   17 July 2018

Latest from the courts

In the Court of Appeal (CA) case of Hasbro European Trading BV (Hasbro) the issue was whether Customs Duty (CD) was due on the import of Beyblades. If they fall within the definition of a toy CD is payable at 4.7%. However, if they are more accurately classified as a game they are treated as duty free – so a significant difference in import cost dependent on what, superficially, appears to be a somewhat question of semantics.

Beyblades 

For the purposes of the case, it is important to understand what a Beyblade is and how it is used.

Beyblade is the brand name for a line of spinning tops originally developed and manufactured by Tomy in Japan. The main novelty is that they are a series of items which are customisable, with interchangeable parts. A Beyblade is set in motion by means of a rip-cord powered launcher.

A “game” is played with two players. Each player is allowed  a number of Beyblades to choose from during a match. Players may use any parts available to them to make their Beyblades), but may not switch parts once a match has started. The first player to reach seven points wins. Points are awarded to the player based on how their Beyblade knocks out the opponent’s

  • One point is awarded if the opponent’s Beyblade stops spinning
  • One point is awarded if the opponent’s Beyblade is knocked out of the stadium or into a pocket on the edge of the ring
  • Two points are awarded if the opponent’s Beyblade breaks during a game

The Arguments

The case concerned the classification of Beyblades’. The appellant, Hasbro contended that Beyblades are correctly classified as “articles for … table or parlour games” under heading 9504 of the Combined Nomenclature. In contrast, HMRC maintained that Beyblades should be classified as “other toys” under heading 9503,  The First-tier Tribunal FTT and the Upper Tribunal (U’) both previously agreed with HMRC’s analysis.

Classification

There are “explanatory notes” to the Harmonised System (HSENNs). The CA ruled that the classification rule which prefers the most specific description does not apply at the level of the HSENs: they are an important guide to interpretation, but do not have force of law.

The Decision

The CA allowed the appeal and went against the decisions in the FTT and UT. The judge concluded that “In the circumstances, it seems to me to fall to us to decide which of the alternative headings provides the more specific description. In my view, it is heading 9504. As I see it, “articles for … parlour games” encompasses a more limited range of goods than “toys” and “more clearly identifies Beyblades”, particularly since, as I say, “articles for … parlour games” reflects the fact that Beyblades are meant to be used in games…”. The fact that Beyblades are used in a competitive scenario seems to have swung the decision which knocked out HMRC. Consequently, there was no CD payable as they fell to be duty free.

Commentary

It does beg the question; why did this issue need to get to the CA for the appellant to finally win (but of course, this isn’t the first case which has raised that question). Perseverance was clearly the key word here. If you are convinced that HMRC is wrong on ay matter, it really does pay to challenge any ruling.

VAT: Wakefield College – Court of Appeal case

By   1 June 2018

Latest from the courts

Further to my article on the Wakefield College case here the Court of Appeal (CA) has dismissed the college’s appeal that certain of its activities were non-business.

Background 

The detailed background was set out in the above linked article, but to recap: In order for certain building works supplied to the appellant to be zero rated the resultant building has to be used for a “relevant charitable purpose” – that is; not for business purposes. This is the case even if there is a small amount of business activity in the building (as long as these can be shown to be insignificant; which is taken to be less than 5% of the activities in the whole building).

The issue

The issue here was whether the education provided by the college could be deemed non-business because, although the majority was grant funded, students were also required to make a contribution to their education. This is dependent upon whether the provision of courses by the college to students paying subsidised fees was, an economic activity carried on by it for the purposes of article 9 of the VAT Directive and consequently, a “business” within Note (6)  of Group 5 in Schedule 8 to the VAT Act 1994.

The 1994 Act provides, at group 5 of schedule 8, for the zero-rating of various supplies made in the course of construction of certain buildings including:

“The supply in the course of construction of

(a) a building … intended solely for use for … a relevant charitable purpose…

of any services related to the construction other than the services of an architect, surveyor or any person acting as a consultant or in a supervisory capacity”.

Note (6) to group 5 provides:

“Use for a relevant charitable purpose means use by a charity… –

(a) otherwise than in the course or furtherance of a business.”

Decision

The CA found that the fact that the students paid for education (an exempt supply) meant that it was a business activity as consideration flowed in both directions. The proportion of the costs paid by the student amounted to between 25% and 30% of the total cost and could therefore not be deemed insignificant.

Commentary

It is worth reconsidering comments made by the judge in his summing up in the Upper Tribunal hearing.

 “We cannot leave this appeal without expressing some disquiet that it should have reached us at all. It is common ground that the College is a charity, and that the bulk of its income is derived from public funds. Because that public funding does not cover all of its costs it is compelled to seek income from other sources; but its doing so does not alter the fact that it remains a charity providing education for young people. If, by careful management or good fortune, it can earn its further income in one way rather than another, or can keep the extent of the income earned in particular ways below an arbitrary threshold, it can escape a tax burden on the construction of a building intended for its charitable purpose, but if it is unable to do so, even to a trivial extent, it is compelled to suffer not some but all of that tax burden. We think it unlikely that Parliament intended such a capricious system. We consider it unlikely, too, that Parliament would consider it a sensible use of public money for the parties to litigate this dispute twice before the FTT and now twice before this tribunal. We do not blame the parties; the College is obliged to maximise the resources available to it for the pursuit of its charitable activities, just as HMRC are obliged to collect tax which is due. Rather, we think the legislation should be reconsidered. It cannot be impossible to relieve 16 charities of an unintended tax burden while at the same time protecting commercial organisations from unfair competition and preventing abuse”.

So, although the result may be seen as “unfair” on the college, the strict letter of the VAT legislation does not provide the courts with any alternative but to impose a VAT charge on the construction works – a charge which the college will have to bear as it is unable to recover it as input tax due to the partial exemption rules.

This illustrates the complexity with both the concept of business/non-business and property and construction issues. When the two technical areas collide, as in this case, matters can get very complicated and proper advice is vital. This is especially important with charities as they benefit from very few VAT reliefs and it is important to ensure that those available are correctly taken advantage of.

VAT – There is no such thing as a free lunch

By   3 January 2018

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In the Court of Appeal case of ING Intermediate Holdings Ltd the issue was whether the provision of “free” banking actually constituted a supply for VAT purposes.

Background

The appeal concerned the recoverability of input tax. ING wished to recover (via deduction against the outputs of a separate investment business) a proportion of VAT expenses incurred in connection with a “deposit-taking” business. ING contended that this activity did not involve any VATable supply. HMRC contended, and did so successfully before both prior tribunals, that it is more than a deposit-taking business and involved the provision of banking services.

The issue

The relevant services were supplied to the public, and the user of the services were not charged a fee. Consequently, the essential issue was; whether the “free” banking services were provided for consideration and, if so, how that consideration ought to be quantified for VAT purposes. If there was a consideration, there was a supply, and that supply would be exempt; thus not providing a right to recovery of input tax for the appellant.

Technical

There is no definition of consideration in either the EC Principal VAT Directive or the VAT Act 1994. In the UK, the meaning was originally taken from contract law, but the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has confirmed that the term is to be given the Community meaning and is not to be variously interpreted by Member States. The Community definition used in ECJ cases is taken from the EC 2nd VAT Directive Annex A13 as follows even though this Directive is no longer in force:

“…the expression “consideration” means everything received in return for the supply of goods or the provision of services, including incidental expenses (packing, transport, insurance etc), that is to say not only the cash amounts charged but also, for example, the value of the goods received in exchange or, in the case of goods or services supplied by order of a public authority, the amount of the compensation received.”

NB: In order for there to be consideration, it must be able to be quantifiable and able to be expressed in monetary terms.

Decision

The CA decided that although there was no distinct charge to the users of the service, there was a supply of services for a consideration. That consideration was the difference between what the customer obtained from the relevant account, and what he could have obtained from an account which was not free, but provided better returns (the interest rate offered must have contained some deduction for the services provided). This was capable of being expressed in monetary terms (although it is interesting to note that the CA stated that it would be undesirable to say which method should be applied, although the court was “entirely satisfied” that it could be done).

Consequently there was a supply for VAT purposes and ING’s appeal was therefore dismissed.

Commentary

HMRC quite often argue that there is a supply when in fact, there is no supply. However, they did have a decent argument in this case and I understand that they are likely to apply this to a number of other long running disputes.  Please contact us if you consider that this case could affect your business or your client’s business.