Tag Archives: courts

VAT: Place of supply of “erotic services”

By Marcus Ward 19 February 2019

Latest from the courts

Readers of a nervous disposition may want to look away now.

In the case of Geelen C-568/17 (in French) the advocate General (AG) was asked for an opinion on the supply of what was coyly called webcam sessions.

Background

The defendant in the main proceedings, Mr Geelen, was a VAT registered person in The Netherlands. He provided the services of the organisation and provision of interactive erotic sessions broadcast live over the Internet. The models were located in the Philippines and Mr Geelen provided them with the necessary hardware and software to transmit the sessions over the Internet. Customers contacted the models via a website after creating an account for this purpose. The sessions were broadcast live and were interactive, which meant that customers had the opportunity to communicate with the models and give them instructions. The services provided by the defendant were intended for the Dutch market. I set out the arrangements here, as I am sure that none of my readers will be aware of such things * polite cough *

This is interesting as an example of technology overtaking legislation which was enacted before such services could even be contemplated (well, by the people drafting the VAT legislation anyway).

The issue

The issue was where was the place of supply of these services. If they were in The Netherlands, then Dutch VAT would apply, but if they were deemed to be outside the EU, no EU VAT would be payable. The tax authorities considered that such services were subject to VAT in The Netherlands and issued a tax assessment notice.

Technical

Generally, the rule is that for B2C services the place of supply (POS) is where the supplier belongs. However, there is an exception for cultural, artistic, and entertainment activities. These are taxed where performed (outside the EU in this case if the exception is applicable).

Opinion

It was the AG’s opinion that, in the first place, there was no doubt that the services in question were entertaining…

However, he opined that the only way to provide cultural activities, entertainment, education, etc. was either to bring service users together at the actual place of service delivery, or to provide a service at the location of the users.

The technological development that has taken place since the relevant legislation was drafted has enabled services in which beneficiaries participate remotely, sometimes even actively, in a cultural, entertainment or other event, without necessarily doing so in real time. In a cultural reference: The “unity of action, time and place”, to refer to the categories of classical theatre, was thus upset.

In the AG’s opinion, these services were not intended to be covered by the exception. Consequently, these were not services “supplied where performed” and the general B2C rules applied, so the POS was The Netherlands and Dutch VAT was applicable. It was concluded that performance does not take place where the models are based, or where the consumer was located, but where Mr Geelen brought together all elements of the supply.

Summary

The legislation must be interpreted as meaning that the services of organising and providing live interactive webcam sex do not constitute services for entertainment purposes within the meaning of the relevant provisions.

VAT: Latest from the courts – Are loan administration services exempt?

By Marcus Ward 1 May 2018

In the First Tier Tribunal (FTT) case of Target Group Limited (Target) the appeal was against a decision by HMRC that loan administration services supplied by Target to a UK bank, Shawbrook Bank Limited (Shawbrook) were standard rated.

Background

Target contracted with Shawbrook to provide services related to loans provided by Shawbrook to its customers in the course of its lending business. Target’s description of its services was “loan account administration services” which amounted to Shawbrook outsourcing the management of the loans to Target. The services that Target provided covered the entire lifecycle of the loans, apart from the making of the initial loan. Target established loan accounts using its own systems, communicates with borrowers as an undisclosed agent of Shawbrook, and dealt with payments by borrowers and all administrative issues that arose. Target had limited discretion. The terms of the loans, including interest rates, were set by Shawbrook. Although Target is involved in dealing with arrears, any enforcement action would be a decision for Shawbrook. Specifically, the contract described Target as being “a provider of loan origination and account operation services” which “performs activities including the functions of: payment processing and servicing and portfolio management services”

Issue

It was accepted that Shawbrook made the loans (not Target) and that the services provided by Target were to Shawbrook and comprised a single (composite) supply for VAT purposes, rather than multiple supplies. Details of the definition between the two types of supply have been hot news in the VAT world for some time. My commentary on relevant recent case law here here here here here and here

The issue was the precise nature of the supplies and whether they qualified for exemption. The areas of dispute included whether Target’s supplies were excluded from exemption as debt collection, and whether the loan accounts fall to be treated as current accounts.

Target’s case was that the principal supply it made to Shawbrook related to payments and transfers in the same way as in the Electronic Data Services Ltd (EDS) case, which related to similar customer-facing loan administration services. (EDS provided loan arrangement and execution services to banks in relation to the granting of personal loans. The services included the provision of a staffed call centre, the printing and despatch of loan agreement documentation, the transfer of funds via the BACS system on the release of loans and the administrative work related to handling loan accounts and repayments). In the alternative, the principal or core supply relates to the operation of accounts (specifically, current accounts), or amounts to transactions concerning debts.

Technical

Article 135(1)(d) of the Council Directive 2006/112/EC (the Principal VAT Directive, or “PVD”) requires Member States to exempt the following transactions: “transactions, including negotiation, concerning deposit and current accounts, payments, transfers, debts, cheques and other negotiable instruments, but excluding debt collection;”

This is transposed into UK legislation via VAT Act 1994, Schedule 9, Group 5, items 1 and 8:

“Item 1. The issue, transfer or receipt of, or any dealing with, money, any security for money or any note or order for the payment of money. …

Item 8. The operation of any current, deposit, or savings account.”

Decision

It was decided that Target’s supplies did not qualify for exemption and they therefore fell to be standard rated. What was fatal to the appellant’s case was the fact that there was an absence of any involvement in the initial loan. Consequently, although it was possible to view the services as “transactions concerning payments” they fell within the debt collection definition and accordingly were not exempt. The judge also ruled that the supplies may be loan accounts, these did not qualify as an exempt operation of a current account.

Commentary

Of course, this decision was important for the recipient of the supply (Shawbrook) as well as Target. Because its supplies were exempt, the VAT on the outsourcing expenditure would be irrecoverable thus creating an extra 20% cost.

This case once again demonstrates that even the smallest variation of facts can produce an unexpected VAT outcome. Care must be taken to analyse precisely what is being provided. Financial Services is a minefield for VAT and it is certainly one area that assumptions of the VAT treatment should be avoided and timely advice sought.

Picture: A loan arranger (apologies)

Tax Tribunal backlog continues to increase

By Marcus Ward 26 April 2018

Both the First Tier Tribunal (FTT) and the Upper Tribunal (UT) which both hear VAT cases, report an increase in the number of cases waiting to be heard. In the case of the FTT the increase is 507 last year which means 28,521 cases are outstanding. The increase of UT cases outstanding is around 40%.

These are not all VAT cases and it is likely that the backlog is predominantly caused by

HMRC’s increased willingness to attack what they see as tax avoidance and evasion (see here)
More businesses being prepared to go to court
HMRC’s determination to “win on every point” rather than, perhaps, seeking a negotiated settlement, and
The increasing complexity of cases heard.

This backlog works in HMRCs favour as in the majority of cases the disputed tax must be paid before a hearing can take place. Delays may also cause anxiety and the burden of devoting resources to appeals which may cause the applicant to withdraw. It is not usually an inexpensive process to go to court and some cases can take a number of years to resolve.

In the current climate, it is more important than ever to challenge HMRC’s decisions. We have found that in the majority of cases we have been able to reduce HMRC assessments, in many cases, to zero. We always work on the basis that it is very important to try to resolve matters with HMRC before going to Tribunal. This is an increasingly difficult task given the political pressure on HMRC to reduce the tax gap (the difference between the amount of tax that should, in theory, be collected by HMRC, against what is actually collected) and the seemingly common tactic of HMRC becoming “entrenched” and being unprepared to shift their position.

Please contact us if you have a dispute with HMRC or are being challenged on any technical points. It is better to deal with these as soon as possible to avoid going to court.

Ding Dong – Avon calling (for VAT)

By Marcus Ward 21 December 2017

Latest from the courts

The CJEU case of Avon Cosmetics Limited considered the validity and completeness of a specific UK derogation called a “Retail Sale Direction”.

Background

Avon Cosmetics Limited (‘Avon’) sells its beauty products in the UK to representatives, known colloquially as ‘Avon Ladies’, who in turn make retail sales to their customers (‘direct selling model’). Many of the Avon Ladies are not registered for VAT. As a result, their profit margins would not normally be subject to VAT. As an example; an Avon Lady may buy goods from Avon at £50 and sell them at £70. In HMRC’s eyes, the £20 difference is not taxed.

“Lost VAT” Derogation

That problem of ‘lost VAT’ at the last stage of the supply chain is typical of direct selling models. In order to deal with the problem, the UK sought and obtained a derogation from the standard rule that VAT is charged on the actual sales price. In Avon’s case that derogation allowed HMRC to charge Avon VAT, not on the wholesale price paid by the unregistered Avon Ladies, but instead on the retail price at which the Avon Ladies would go on to sell the products to the final consumer. However, the way the derogation is applied does not take into account the costs incurred by the unregistered representatives in their retail selling activities, and the input tax that they would normally have been able to deduct had they been VAT registered (‘notional input tax’). In particular, where Avon Ladies buy products for demonstration purposes (not to resell but to use as a selling aid) they cannot deduct VAT on those purchases as input tax. The result is that the disregarded notional input tax in relation to such costs ‘sticks’ in the supply chain and increases the overall VAT charged on the direct selling model over that charged on sales through ordinary retail outlets.

Challenge

The appeal by Avon concerns the interpretation and validity of the Derogation.

In particular

whether there is an obligation to take into account the notional input tax of direct resellers such as the Avon Ladies
whether there was an obligation for the UK to bring the issue of notional input tax to the EC’s attention when it requested the Derogation, and
what would be/what are the consequences of failing to comply with either of those obligations?

Result

The CJEU found that neither the derogation authorised by Council Decision 89/534/EEC of 24 May 1989 authorising the UK to apply, in respect of certain supplies to unregistered resellers nor, national measures implementing that decision infringe the principles of proportionality and fiscal neutrality. Therefore, output tax remains due on the ultimate retail sale value, but there is no credit for any VAT incurred by the Avon Ladies.

Is the Upper Tribunal bound by High Court decisions?

By Marcus Ward 11 July 2017

Upper Tribunal versus High Court

In the case of Meena Seddon Settlement which actually involved Inheritance Tax, the First Tier Tribunal (FTT) was required to decide whether the Upper Tribunal is bound by decisions made in the High Court. The FTT decision will doubtless affect VAT cases in the future.

It decided to follow a precedent set by the Upper Tribunal over an earlier decision by the High Court.

The taxpayer contended that the matter should be decided on the basis of a previous High Court decision. HMRC argued on the basis of a later Upper Tribunal decision. In normal circumstances, a later decision should take precedence over the earlier if both decisions have the same authority and have fully considered the previous judgments. However, if the taxpayer was correct to say that the Upper Tribunal was bound by precedents set by the High Court, the later decision could be disregarded as being wrong in law.

The FTT decided that it was the intention of Parliament that the Upper Tribunal was not bound to follow High Court precedents. This was notwithstanding the fact that a High Court could have a supervisory role over the Upper Tribunal in cases of judicial review. Therefore, it determined the case on the authority of the later Upper Tribunal decision in favour of HMRC.

VAT Latest from the courts – what is an economic activity by a charity?

By Marcus Ward 5 September 2016

In the VAT case of Longridge on the Thames (Longbridge) here the Court of Appeal considered previous decisions at the First Tier Tribunal (FTT) and Upper Tribunal (UT) on whether Longbridge carried on an economic activity. This is an important case as it goes some way in determining the meaning of “business” in light of the term “economic activity” used in EC legislation. The term “business” is only used in UK legislation, The Principal VAT Directive refers to “economic activity” rather than business, and since UK domestic legislation must conform to the Directive both terms must be seen as having the same meaning. Since the very first days of VAT there have been disagreements over what constitutes a “business”. I have previously commented on this matter here

Background

Longbridge is a charity. It uses volunteers to provide boating activities (mainly to young people) on the Thames. The fees charged by Longbridge were often at below cost and the charity relied on donations to continue its operations. It constructed a new building and sought VAT zero rating of these costs on the basis that the building was to be used for non-business purposes. Consequently, it was crucial to the relief claimed that the charity was not carrying out a business in VAT terms. The FTT and the UT found that the charity’s “predominant concern” was not to make supplies for a consideration and therefore it was not in business. These findings were based on long standing case law, the most salient being; Lord Fisher and Morrison’s Academy Boarding Houses Association. Lord Fisher set out a series of tests which HMRC rely on to determine whether a business exists – considered here and here

Decision

The Court of Appeal allowed HMRC’s appeal. It decided that Longridge was carrying on an economic activity and therefore the construction of the new building could not be zero rated. The decision is worth considering in full, however, the court held that there was a “direct link” between the fees paid and service the recipients received, even if it was subsidised in certain instances and that Longbridge was furthering its charitable objectives. The requirement for a direct link was clearly demonstrated in The Apple and Pear Development Council case. The establishment of the direct link meant that Longridge was carrying in business (in UK law).

Commentary

The important test for whether an economic activity is being carried on is now; the direct link between payment and service. There is no longer the requirement to consider the test of “predominant concern” and in fact it was stated in the decision by the judges that this test is “unhelpful and may be misleading.” We must now ignore; the motive of the provider of the service, its status as a charity, the amount charged, whether subsidies are received by the charity, and whether volunteers are involved in the relevant activities.

This is a very big change in the analysis of whether a business exists and basically means that previous cases on this matter were wrongly decided. It brings the UK into line with the EC on the definition of an economic activity and therefore provides clarity on this matter – which has long been an area which has desperately required it.

It means that, unless the decision is reversed at the Supreme Court, we say goodbye to the unloved Lord Fisher tests. However, this may be very bad news for charities and not for profit entities that have relied on these tests to avoid VAT registration and charging VAT on their supplies. It is likely that many more charities will be dragged into the VAT net. It remains to be seen whether this case will trigger a renewed targeting effort on charities by HMRC, but what is clear is that charities need to be conscious of this new turn of events and consider their position. We strongly recommend that any bodies which have had previous discussions with HMRC on this point and any entity which is affected by this decision take professional advice immediately.

VAT Latest from the courts – HMRC’s bad ‘phone service

By Marcus Ward 18 August 2016

As we know, late payment of VAT results in a Default Surcharge. Details of DS here

However, if a taxpayer has a reasonable excuse the DS will not be due. In the interesting recent case of McNamara Joinery Ltd here

The appeal was on the grounds that HMRC itself caused the default. The business was successful in the appeal on the grounds that its agent could not contact HMRC to arrange a time to pay agreement because of HMRC’s poor telephone service. Anyone who has attempted to contact HMRC by telephone will appreciate that this isn’t a one-off case!

Background

The appellant had a previous history of submitting returns on time, but making late payments late such that the period in question would give rise to a DS if the return or payment was late. Appreciating that the business would not have sufficient funds to meet the VAT payment due, it instructed its agent to contact HMRC on its behalf in an attempt to arrange a “time to pay” (TTP) agreement. The agent attempted to do this two days before the payment was due. However, there were significant problems with the telephone service and the agent was unable to get through as the line kept “going dead” (It appears from later comments made by HMRC that this was due to the volume of calls made at the end of the VAT period). A TTP agreement was subsequently reached, but only after the due date which HMRC argued was too late to avoid the DS.

Decision

On the subject of reasonable excuse, the FT Tribunal observed that “A reasonable excuse is normally an unexpected event, something unforeseeable, something out of the appellant’s control. Insufficiency of funds is not regarded as a reasonable excuse although the reason for the insufficiency might be. It is unfortunately part of the hazards of trade that debtors fail to keep promises to pay. These submissions cannot be regarded as establishing for the appellant a reasonable excuse for the late payment.”
It continued “However, faced with the problem of not having received promised payments, the appellant through its agent did all that it could do in the circumstances…., its agent tried repeatedly to contact HMRC by telephone but was unsuccessful until 12 February 2016 when a time to pay agreement was made and subsequently the arrangements made were adhered to. In the Tribunal’s view this repeated failure to contact HMRC was unexpected and unforeseeable”. Therefore the taxpayer had a reasonable excuse and the DS was removed.

The Judge did not accept HMRC’s submission that the appellant should have been aware that there was a likelihood that there would be a large volume of calls being made to HMRC on the days immediately prior to the due date and that as a result the appellant could reasonably have expected delays in being able to make contact. HMRC do not publish times when their lines are likely to be busy. Rather than expecting delays it is reasonable for a taxpayer to expect telephone calls to HMRC to be answered without delay. In the Tribunal’s view HMRC were in a better position than the appellant to know when there is a likelihood of a large volume of calls and they should have arrangements in place to deal with the higher volume of calls promptly.

So HMRC lost this case because they failed to answer the phone.

Lessons to be learned

One cannot rely on HMRC answering their own phones, even though they are fully aware that there will be an increased demand at certain times. They do not have arrangements in place to deal with the known demand. They do not have a reasonable excuse for not dealing with taxpayers!
When attempting to contact HMRC it is a very good idea to keep an accurate log.
If it is likely that a business is experiencing cashflow issues, contact HMRC as soon as possible and do not leave it to the last moment.
It is possible to arrange a TTP agreement with HMRC.
A business should take advice from their advisers as soon as possible to avoid DSs. This may avoid both a TTP position and/or a DS.

VAT – Latest from the courts: impact of outside the scope income

By Marcus Ward 25 July 2016

Outside the scope (of VAT) income leads to loss of input tax: Upper Tribunal (UT) decision

In the recent UT case of VCS it was decided that input tax relating to outside the scope activities of the appellant was not recoverable.

Background

VCS is a car park operator, which manages and operates car parking for its clients on private land. Inter alia, providing parking control services, including the issue of parking permits and enforcement action (solely at the discretion of VCS).

In practice, most of VCS’s revenue is derived not from providing parking permits, but from parking charge notices (“PCNs”) which it issues to motorists who are in breach of the rules for parking in the car parks. In the period considered, approximately 92% of VCS’s income came from PCNs, and just 8% from parking permits. In March 2013 the Court of Appeal (CoA) decided that the PCN revenue was not subject to VAT. This was because VAT is chargeable only in respect of revenue from the supply of goods or services. The CoA held that the PCN revenue was not earned in respect of supplies of services liable to VAT. Rather, the PCN revenue represented damages for breach of contracts between VCS and the motorists and/or damages for trespass by the motorists.

Decision

The UT agreed with the First-tier Tribunal’s decision that that VCS was not entitled to recover input tax that related to outside the scope (PCN) income and that it was reasonable to assume that since 92% of the income generated by VCS was outside the scope of VAT, only 8% of the input tax incurred on its costs should be deductible.

Commentary

It is clear that there is a direct link between the general overheads of the business in respect of which VCS incurred input VAT and both VCS’s taxable supplies of parking permits and the PCN income. The appellant’s contention that a taxable person (such as VCS) is entitled to deduct all the input tax if the goods or services are used to any extent for the purposes of taxed transactions was doomed to failure and the chairman stated that “…we accept HMRC’s interpretation of Article 168 PVD. Accordingly, where purchased goods or services are used by a taxable person both for transactions in respect of which VAT is deductible (ie; taxable supplies) and for transactions in respect of which VAT is not deductible (ie; where the transactions do not constitute economic activity or do not constitute taxable supplies (even though they may be transactions undertaken in the course of a taxable person’s business) or where the supplies are exempt), VAT may only be deducted in so far as (that is, to the extent that) it is attributable to taxable supplies.”.

There are no surprises in this decision, but it serves as a timely reminder that not only is “VAT free” income not always a beneficial treatment, but any income that does not relate to a business’s’ taxable supplies can create costs and complexities, whether it be outside the scope, non-business, or exempt.

Outside the scope income can be received by any business in certain circumstances, and it must be recognised in its VAT reporting as this case demonstrates that not all input tax may be recovered and there is no de minimis for input tax attributed to outside the scope and non-business, it is simply not input tax.

Full case Vehicle Control Services Limited (VCS)

VAT Latest from the courts – what is a business?

By Marcus Ward 8 June 2016

In the CJEU case of * * takes a deep breath * * Lajvér Meliorációs Nonprofit Kft. and Lajvér Csapadékvízrendezési Nonprofit Kft the court considered whether these Not For Profit companies were making taxable supplies (economic activity). This then dictated whether input tax incurred by them was recoverable.

As a starting point, it may be helpful to look at what the words “economic activity”, “business”, “taxable supplies” and “taxable person” mean: The term “business” is only used in UK legislation, The Principal VAT Directive refers to “economic activity” rather than business and since UK domestic legislation must conform to the Directive both terms must be seen as having the same meaning. Since the very first days of VAT there have been disagreements over what constitutes a “business”. I have only recently ended a dispute over this definition for a (as it turns out) very happy client. In the UK the tests were set out as long ago as 1981 and may be summarised as follows:

Is the activity a serious undertaking earnestly pursued?
Is the activity an occupation or function, which is actively pursued with reasonable or recognisable continuity?
Does the activity have a certain measure of substance in terms of the quarterly or annual value of taxable supplies made (bearing in mind that exempt supplies can also be business)?
Is the activity conducted in a regular manner and on sound and recognised business principles?
Is the activity predominately concerned with the making of taxable supplies for a consideration?
Are the taxable supplies that are being made of a kind which, subject to differences of detail, are commonly made by those who seek to profit from them?

If there is no business, an entity cannot be making taxable supplies.

In EC Legislation, Article 9(1) of Directive 2006/112 provides: that “a ‘Taxable person’ shall mean any person who, independently, carries out in any place any economic activity, whatever the purpose or results of that activity.”

The case

The case involved the Not For Profit companies constructing and operating a water disposal system. When complete, it was intended to charge a “modest” fee to users of the system. The companies engaged in economic activities that were not intended to make a profit and only engaged in a commercial activity on an ancillary basis.

The majority of the funding for the work was provided by State (Hungarian) and EC aid. The Hungarian authority formed the view that, because a nominal fee was charged this did not amount to an economic activity and so there was no right to deduct input tax incurred on the costs of getting the system operational. The CJEU went straight to judgement and decided that the construction and operation of the system could rightly be regarded as an economic activity and found for the taxpayer. It also provided a very helpful and clear summary in respect of “business” by commenting that “… the fact that the price paid for an economic transaction is higher or lower than the cost price, and, therefore, higher or lower than the open market value, is irrelevant for the purpose of establishing whether it was a transaction effected for consideration …”.

NB: The one area that the CJEU did refer back to the National Court however, was whether the transaction at issue in the case was a wholly artificial arrangement which did not reflect economic reality and was set up with the sole aim of obtaining a tax advantage.

It is interesting to compare this finding with the UK case law above, especially the points concerning “a certain measure of substance in terms of the quarterly or annual value of taxable supplies made” and “sound and recognised business principles”. I strongly suspect that what constitutes a business will continue to occupy advisers and HMRC and throw up disputes until the end of time (and/or the end of VAT….).

Full case here

VAT – Latest from the courts – Holding companies management charges. Norseman Gold plc

By Marcus Ward 15 February 2016

The Norseman Gold plc case considered whether a holding company could recover input tax incurred on certain costs. This is turn depended on whether the holding company was making taxable supplies. Specifically; management charges to non VAT-grouped subsidiary companies.

The Upper Tribunal has recently released its decision. It upheld the First-tier Tribunal’s decision which confirmed that, although the management services in this case could have been considered as economic activities for VAT purposes, there was insufficient evidence to demonstrate that Norseman was making, or intended to make, taxable supplies when the input tax was reclaimed. The UT found that “…vague and general intention that payment would be made …” for management services was insufficient to show a connection between the VAT incurred and taxable supplies. Consequently, HMRC’s assessments to recover the relevant input tax were upheld.

Importance

This case emphasises the importance of holding companies having appropriate processes and ensuring that proper documentation is in place to evidence, not only the intention to make taxable supplies of management charges, but that those charges were actually made to subsidiaries. It is also important to ensure that actual management of the subsidiaries take place, and a record of this management is retained. Simply making a charge to subsidiaries is insufficient if no services are actually supplied as this will not constitute an economic activity.

Often significant costs can be incurred by a holding company in cases such as acquisitions and restructuring. It is important that these costs are incurred by, and invoiced to the appropriate entity in order for the VAT on them to be recovered. Consideration must be given to how the input tax is recovered before it is incurred and the appropriate structure put in place.

Please contact me should you require further information on this point or would like to discuss the matter further.