Tag Archives: tribunal

VAT: Latest from the courts – Hastings Insurance Place Of Supply

By Marcus Ward 22 February 2018

In the First Tier Tribunal (FTT) case of Hastings Insurance the issue was where was the place of supply (POS) of services?

The POS rules determine under which VAT regime the supply is treated, whether the associated input tax may be recovered and how the services are reported. Consequently, determining the POS for any supply is vitally important because getting it wrong may not only mean that tax is overpaid in one country, but it is not declared in the appropriate country so that penalties and interest are levied. Getting it wrong also means that the input tax position is likely to be incorrect; meaning that VAT can be over or underclaimed. The rules for the POS of services are notoriously complicated and even subtle differences in a business’ situation can produce a different VAT outcome.

Background

Hastings is an insurance services company operating in the UK. The appeal relates to whether the appellant was able to recover input tax it incurred in the UK which was attributable to supplies of; broking, underwriting support and claims handling services made to a Gibraltar based insurance underwriter (Advantage) which supplied motor insurance to UK customers through Hastings. In order to obtain credit for the relevant input tax, the supply to Advantage must have a POS outside the EU, eg: the recipient had a place of belonging in Gibraltar and not the UK. HMRC argued that Advantage belonged in the UK so that the input tax could not have been properly recoverable. Consequently, the issue was where Advantage “belonged” for VAT purposes.

The POS rules set out where a person “belongs”.

A taxable person belongs:

where it has a business establishment, or;
if different, where it has a fixed establishment, or;
if it has both a business establishment and a fixed establishment (or several such establishments), where the establishment is located which is most directly concerned with the supply

Further details on this point are explained here

Contentions

It was not disputed that Advantage had a business establishment in Gibraltar. The question was whether it also had a fixed establishment in the UK and, if so, whether the supplies of services were made to that fixed establishment rather than to its business establishment in Gibraltar. HMRC contended that Advantage had a fixed establishment in the UK which was “more directly concerned with the supply of insurance” such that the POS was the UK. This was on the basis that Advantage had human and technical resources in the UK which were actually used to provide its services to UK customers. Hastings obviously argued to the contrary; that Advantage had no UK fixed establishment and that services were supplied to, and by, Advantage in Gibraltar.

Technical

It may be helpful to look briefly at CJEU case law which considered what an establishment other than a business establishment is. It is: “characterised by a sufficient degree of permanence and a suitable structure in terms of human and technical resources”, where looking at the location of the recipient of the supply, “to enable it to receive and use the services supplied to it for its own needs” or, where looking at the location of the supplier, “to enable it to provide the services which it supplies”.

Decision

The FTT concluded that the input tax in dispute is recoverable because it was attributable to supplies made to Advantage on the basis that it belonged outside the EU (as interpreted in accordance with the relevant EU rules and case law). After a long and exhaustive analysis of the facts the summary was;

The appellant’s human and technical resources, through which it provided the services to Advantage, did not comprise a fixed establishment of Advantage in the UK, whether for the purposes of determining where Advantage made supplies of insurance or where the appellant made the supplies of its services.
Even if, contrary to the FTT’s view, those resources comprised a fixed establishment in the UK, there is no reason to depart from the location of Advantage’s business establishment in Gibraltar as the place of belonging/supply in the circumstances of this case.

Summary

If this case affects you or your clients it will be rewarding to consider the details of the arrangements which are helpfully set out fully in the decision. This was, in my opinion, a borderline case which could have been decided differently quiet easily. A significant amount of the evidence produced was deemed inadmissible; which is an interesting adjunct to the main issue in itself. Whether HMRC take this matter further remains to be seen. It is always worthwhile reviewing a business’ POS in depth and we are able to assist with this.

VAT: Timeshare is exempt

By Marcus Ward 19 February 2018

Latest from the courts

The Fortyseven Park Street Ltd (FPSL) Upper Tribunal case.

Brief technical overview

In general terms the provision of a “timeshare” in the UK is standard rated for VAT. This is because HMRC regard supplies of this type to be similar to hotels, inns, boarding houses and are treated as “serviced flats” (other than those for permanent residential use). The appellant sought to argue that what it provided was not “similar” to a hotel or boarding house.

Background

The issue in the FPSL case was whether “Fractional Interests” (akin to timeshares) in a property amount to an exempt supply of that property. The Fractional Interests entitled FPSL’s clients up to 21 days a year in block of apartments in Mayfair.

The First Tier Tribunal (FTT) determined that here were three main issues:

The FTT decided that the supplies of the Fractional Interests fell within the exemption from VAT provided for the leasing or letting of immovable property.
However, the FTT further found that the land exemption was excluded because the grant of the Fractional Interests was the provision of accommodation in a similar establishment to an hotel.
The therefore FTT dismissed FPSL’s argument that under the principle of fiscal neutrality the supplies of the Fractional Interests should be treated in the same way (exempt) as more traditional timeshare interests.

Decision

The UT decided that the relevant interests provided amounted to an exempt supply of the property. This was on the basis that the judges concluded that the grant of the Fractional Interest was the grant of a right to occupy a residence and to exclude others from enjoying such a right, and was thus within the concept of the “letting of immovable property”. It was also found that the supply was a passive activity and not outside the land exemption by reason of FPSL having added significant value to the service despite providing; certain additional facilities, services (eg; concierge) and benefits to clients – this was not, it was decided, a situation where the appellant had actively exploited the asset to add value to the supply (which may have made it taxable). The UT also ruled that as the concierge was provided by a third party, it could not be combined to form a single supply made by FPSL thus emphasising the fact that this was a more passive activity.

It was noted that there was a distinction in this case from supplies of boutique hotels (which are standard rated hotel accommodation) because residents were contracting for the supply of a long-term right to occupy an apartment and not a series of short-term stays and that the high amount paid for the Fractional Interest brought with it certain financial obligations which are not found in the hotel industry.

Commentary

This is an interesting case and the decision somewhat surprising. There is a subtle distinction between what was provided here and serviced flats or hotel accommodation, but the UT found it sufficient to apply exempt treatment. If you, or your clients may be affected by this decision, please contact us.

VAT – There is no such thing as a free lunch

By Marcus Ward 3 January 2018

Latest from the courts

In the Court of Appeal case of ING Intermediate Holdings Ltd the issue was whether the provision of “free” banking actually constituted a supply for VAT purposes.

Background

The appeal concerned the recoverability of input tax. ING wished to recover (via deduction against the outputs of a separate investment business) a proportion of VAT expenses incurred in connection with a “deposit-taking” business. ING contended that this activity did not involve any VATable supply. HMRC contended, and did so successfully before both prior tribunals, that it is more than a deposit-taking business and involved the provision of banking services.

The issue

The relevant services were supplied to the public, and the user of the services were not charged a fee. Consequently, the essential issue was; whether the “free” banking services were provided for consideration and, if so, how that consideration ought to be quantified for VAT purposes. If there was a consideration, there was a supply, and that supply would be exempt; thus not providing a right to recovery of input tax for the appellant.

Technical

There is no definition of consideration in either the EC Principal VAT Directive or the VAT Act 1994. In the UK, the meaning was originally taken from contract law, but the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has confirmed that the term is to be given the Community meaning and is not to be variously interpreted by Member States. The Community definition used in ECJ cases is taken from the EC 2nd VAT Directive Annex A13 as follows even though this Directive is no longer in force:

“…the expression “consideration” means everything received in return for the supply of goods or the provision of services, including incidental expenses (packing, transport, insurance etc), that is to say not only the cash amounts charged but also, for example, the value of the goods received in exchange or, in the case of goods or services supplied by order of a public authority, the amount of the compensation received.”

NB: In order for there to be consideration, it must be able to be quantifiable and able to be expressed in monetary terms.

Decision

The CA decided that although there was no distinct charge to the users of the service, there was a supply of services for a consideration. That consideration was the difference between what the customer obtained from the relevant account, and what he could have obtained from an account which was not free, but provided better returns (the interest rate offered must have contained some deduction for the services provided). This was capable of being expressed in monetary terms (although it is interesting to note that the CA stated that it would be undesirable to say which method should be applied, although the court was “entirely satisfied” that it could be done).

Consequently there was a supply for VAT purposes and ING’s appeal was therefore dismissed.

Commentary

HMRC quite often argue that there is a supply when in fact, there is no supply. However, they did have a decent argument in this case and I understand that they are likely to apply this to a number of other long running disputes. Please contact us if you consider that this case could affect your business or your client’s business.

Ding Dong – Avon calling (for VAT)

By Marcus Ward 21 December 2017

Latest from the courts

The CJEU case of Avon Cosmetics Limited considered the validity and completeness of a specific UK derogation called a “Retail Sale Direction”.

Background

Avon Cosmetics Limited (‘Avon’) sells its beauty products in the UK to representatives, known colloquially as ‘Avon Ladies’, who in turn make retail sales to their customers (‘direct selling model’). Many of the Avon Ladies are not registered for VAT. As a result, their profit margins would not normally be subject to VAT. As an example; an Avon Lady may buy goods from Avon at £50 and sell them at £70. In HMRC’s eyes, the £20 difference is not taxed.

“Lost VAT” Derogation

That problem of ‘lost VAT’ at the last stage of the supply chain is typical of direct selling models. In order to deal with the problem, the UK sought and obtained a derogation from the standard rule that VAT is charged on the actual sales price. In Avon’s case that derogation allowed HMRC to charge Avon VAT, not on the wholesale price paid by the unregistered Avon Ladies, but instead on the retail price at which the Avon Ladies would go on to sell the products to the final consumer. However, the way the derogation is applied does not take into account the costs incurred by the unregistered representatives in their retail selling activities, and the input tax that they would normally have been able to deduct had they been VAT registered (‘notional input tax’). In particular, where Avon Ladies buy products for demonstration purposes (not to resell but to use as a selling aid) they cannot deduct VAT on those purchases as input tax. The result is that the disregarded notional input tax in relation to such costs ‘sticks’ in the supply chain and increases the overall VAT charged on the direct selling model over that charged on sales through ordinary retail outlets.

Challenge

The appeal by Avon concerns the interpretation and validity of the Derogation.

In particular

whether there is an obligation to take into account the notional input tax of direct resellers such as the Avon Ladies
whether there was an obligation for the UK to bring the issue of notional input tax to the EC’s attention when it requested the Derogation, and
what would be/what are the consequences of failing to comply with either of those obligations?

Result

The CJEU found that neither the derogation authorised by Council Decision 89/534/EEC of 24 May 1989 authorising the UK to apply, in respect of certain supplies to unregistered resellers nor, national measures implementing that decision infringe the principles of proportionality and fiscal neutrality. Therefore, output tax remains due on the ultimate retail sale value, but there is no credit for any VAT incurred by the Avon Ladies.

VAT: Time limit for claiming input tax

By Marcus Ward 4 December 2017

Latest from the courts.

In the helpful CJEU case of Biosafe (this link is in French, so with thanks to Mr Lees – for my schoolboy French and more helpfully; a translation website) the issue was the date at which input tax can be reclaimed in cases where VAT was charged at an incorrect rate (lower than should have been applied) and this is subsequently corrected by the issue of an additional VAT only invoice.

Background

The two parties to a transaction believed that a reduced rate of VAT applied to the supply of certain goods. The Portuguese tax authorities subsequently determined the correct VAT rate applicable was higher. The recipient refused to pay the additional tax on the grounds that the recovery of the input tax may be time barred.

Decision

Broadly, the CJEU held that VAT may be recovered on the date when a “correcting” (VAT only) invoice is issued, rather than when the initial tax point was created. So the capping provisions applicable in this case where not an issue.

Commentary

This is often an issue, and I come across it usually in the construction industry (where various VAT rates may be applicable). It is an important issue as in the UK we have a four year capping provision. If the initial supply was over four years ago, any claim for input tax will be time barred if this was deemed to be the only tax point.

In my experience, this issue does create some “confusion” in HMRC and is a helpful point of reference if there are any future disagreements on this matter. It must be correct that the right to recover input tax only arises when there is a document (invoice) issued to support such a claim as it would not be possible to make a claim without evidence to support it. If the original tax point is used as a one-off date which cannot be subsequently moved, it means that the claim for the difference in the two rates of tax (the original incorrect rate and the later, higher rate) could not be made after the capping period; which seems, at the very least, unfair. The later correcting invoice therefore creates a new tax point.

Please contact us if you have any similar input tax claims disallowed as being time barred, or you are currently in a dispute with HMRC on this matter.

VAT – Littlewoods compound interest Supreme Court judgement

By Marcus Ward 6 November 2017

Latest from the courts

The Littlewoods Limited case

This is a long running case on whether HMRC is required to pay compound interest (in addition to simple statutory interest) in cases of official error (Please see below for details of how the overpayment initially arose). Such errors are usually in situations where UK law is incompatible with EC legislation. Previous articles have covered the progress of the case: here and here

Background

Littlewoods was seeking commercial restitution for overpayments of VAT previously made. It’s view was that an appropriate recompense was the payment of compound interest. It was accepted by all parties that statutory interest amounted to only 24% of Littlewoods’ actual time value loss from the relevant overpayments. There are many cases stood behind this case, so it was important for both taxpayers and HMRC.

Decision

The Supreme Court rejected Littlewoods’ claim for compound interest of circa £1.25 billion on VAT repayments of £205 million for the years 1973 to 2004. The court held that the correct reading of the VAT Act is that it excludes common law claims and although references are made to interest otherwise available these are clearly references to interest under other statutory provisions and not the common law. To decide otherwise would render the limitations in the VAT Act otherwise meaningless. Further, it held that the lower courts were wrong to construe the Court of Justice of the European Union’s (CJEU) requirement of an “adequate indemnity” as meaning “complete reimbursement”. The Supreme Court construed the term as “reasonable redress”.

The above reasoning was based on the following reasons:

They read the CJEU’s judgment as indicating that the simple interest already received by Littlewoods was adequate even though it was acknowledged to be only about 24% of its actual loss
It is the common practice among Member States to award simple interest with the repayment of tax. If the CJEU intended to outlaw that practice they would have said so
The reading “reasonable redress” is consistent with the CJEU’s prior and subsequent case law.

Implications

The Supreme Court ruling means that claims for compound interest in cases of official error cannot be pursued through a High Court claim. It would appear that, unless other appeals which are currently listed to be heard are successful, (extremely unlikely given the comments of the Supreme Court) this is the end of the road for compound interest claims.

History of the overpayment

During the period with which this case is concerned, the claimants Littlewoods carried on catalogue sales businesses. It distributed catalogues to customers and sold them goods shown in the catalogues. In order to carry on its businesses, it employed agents, who received a commission in return for their services. They could elect to be paid the commission either in cash or in kind. Commission was paid in cash at the rate of 10% of the sales achieved by the agent. Commission paid in kind took the form of goods supplied by Littlewoods, equal in price to 12.5% of the sales achieved by the agent.

As suppliers of goods, Littlewoods were obliged to account to HMRC for the VAT due in respect of their chargeable supplies. Between 1973 and 2004, they accounted for VAT on the supplies which it made to its agents, as commission paid in kind, on the basis that the taxable amount of those supplies was reduced by the enhancement in the commission, that is to say by 2.5%. On a correct understanding of VAT law, the taxable amount of the supplies was actually reduced by the entire 12.5% which constituted the agents’ commission. Consequently, Littlewoods accounted for and paid more VAT to HMRC than was due.

VAT: Distinction between goods and services. Mercedes Benz Financial Services case

By Marcus Ward 17 October 2017

In the CJEU case of Mercedes Benz Financial Services (MBFS) the issue was whether certain supplies where of goods or services.

Technical Background

Before looking at the case, it is worthwhile considering the difference between goods and services and why the distinction is important. For most transactions the difference is clear, although sometimes (such as in this case) it is not immediately apparent. A starting point is that services are “something other than supplying goods”. Difficulties can arise in areas such as; provision of; information, software and, as MBFS discovered, Hire Purchase (HP)/leasing.

The distinction is important for two main reasons:

VAT liability – Goods and services may have different VAT rates applicable
Tax point – goods and services have different tax point rules, see here

The difference between HP and Leasing arrangements:

In an HP agreement the intention is usually for the ownership of the goods to pass when the final payment has been made. The transaction therefore relates to a supply of goods. If title to goods does not pass, this is leasing and represents a supply of services.

Case Background

MBFS offered certain contract purchases which were similar to many personal contract purchase deals for vehicles. These featured regular monthly payments with a final balloon payment. In the MBFS arrangements in question a significant difference to “usual” personal contract purchase agreements was that the balloon payment represented over 40% of the price of the car and payment of this fee was entirely optional.

The EU rules set out that there is a supply of goods where “in the normal course of events” ownership will pass at the latest upon payment of the final instalment. Consequently, the focus here was on whether the optional final payment meant that in the normal course of events the ownership of the car would pass to the customer.

Decision

The CJEU decided that the supplies were those of services rather than goods. This was based on the fact that, although the ownership transfer clause is an indicator of the transaction representing a supply of goods, there was a genuine economic alternative to the option being exercised. The circa 40% of the car price was a significant amount and it did not immediately follow that all customers would make this final payment. It was observed that in a “traditional” HP arrangement making the final payment was the “only economically rational choice”. This meant that the supply was one of services.

VAT Impact

As this was ruled to be a supply of services, output tax was not due from MBFS at the start of the contract (as would have been the case if the supply had been one of goods). This results in a significant cashflow saving.

Commentary

Any business which provides vehicles via HP or leasing arrangements should review its supplies and contracts to determine whether it can take advantage of this CJEU ruling. We are able to assist in this process.

VAT: Extent of zero rating for a construction by a charity

By Marcus Ward 9 October 2017

Latest from the courts

In the First Tier Tribunal (FTT) case of The Trustees of Litton & Thorner Community Hall the issue was whether certain construction works were a completion of an initial build or whether they were an extension or an annex to a pre-existing building. And if an annex, whether it was capable of functioning independently from the existing building and whether there is a main access to the annex.

Background

The appellant began construction of a hall in 2008. It was intended that the hall would be available for a school to use and also for it to be available at for village use and other activities, such as by local youth clubs and a scout group. There was no dispute that the original construction was zero rated via VAT Act 1994, Schedule 8, Group 5, item 2 (The supply in the course of the construction of a building designed for a relevant charitable purpose).

A decision was made to install ground source heat pumps to feed the heating system. However the space occupied to accommodate the system meant that there was insufficient storage space in the hall. So at the time of construction, but before planning permission was obtained, it was decided with the builder that a steel joist should be incorporated within the east wall of the hall in order to facilitate the necessary support and access when the envisaged storage facility was added. The additional planning permission was granted in November 2011, three years after building work commenced. The facility was eventually able to be used when work was completed in 2014. The delay was caused (not surprisingly) by funding issues. It was the VAT treatment of work relating to the addition of the storage area which was the subject of the appeal, with HMRC considering that it was either standard rated work to the building or was a standard rated extension to it.

Technical background

The provisions relevant to the appeal are VAT Act 1994, Schedule 8, Group 5, Notes 16 and 17. It is worthwhile taking a moment to consider these in their entirety:

Note 16

For the purpose of this Group, the construction of a building does not include

(a ) the conversion, reconstruction or alteration of an existing building; or

(b) any enlargement of, or extension to, an existing building except to the extent the enlargement or extension creates an additional dwelling or dwellings; or

(c) subject to Note (17) below, the construction of an annexe to an existing building.

Note 17

Note 16(c) above shall not apply where the whole or a part of an annexe is intended for use solely for a relevant charitable purpose and;

(a) the annexe is capable of functioning independently from the existing building; and

(b) the only access or where there is more than one means of access, the main access to:

(i) the annexe is not via the existing building; and

(ii) the existing building is not via the annexe.

The Appeal

The Trustees appealed on two separate and distinct bases:

(1) That the additional building was the completion of the original building and neither an extension nor an annex to it. It was their case that the temporal disconnect between the two building processes must be seen in the factual context, with particular reference to the decision to put in a lintel to allow the building to be completed when additional monies and planning permission were available. Additionally, alongside this fact was that the appellant was a non-commercial organisation and so things could not progress as expeditiously as they might have done if those things were being undertaken by a commercial organisation.

(2) The second basis is that, in any event, the additional building is zero rated by reference to paragraphs 16(c) and 17 of Group 5 to Schedule 8. It was the appellant’s case that the additional building is an annex intended for use solely for relevant charitable purposes and it meets the conditions set out in paragraph 17(a) & (b).

Decision

The FTT decided that the work was subject to zero rating. Not only was it part of the original construction (albeit that there was a significant time period between the building original work and the work on the storage area) but also, even if the storage area is considered as being separate, it was ruled that, on the facts, it was an annex rather than an extension, so it also qualified for zero rating on this basis.

Commentary

The date a building is “completed” is often an issue which creates significant disputes with HMRC, not only for charities, but for “regular” housebuilders. I have also encountered the distinction between an annex and an extension representing a very real topic, especially with academy schools. Even small changes in circumstances can create differing VAT outcomes. My advice is to seek assistance form a VAT consultant at the earliest stage possible. It may be that with a slight amendment to plans, zero rating may be obtained in order to avoid an extra 20% on building costs which charities, more often than not, are unable to reclaim.

Links to what we can offer to schools here, and charities here

Additionally, our offering to the construction industry here

VAT: Separate or composite supply? The Ice Rink Company Ltd case

By Marcus Ward 4 October 2017

Latest from the courts – Appellant on thin ice?

In the first Tier Tribunal case of The Ice Rink Company Ltd the issue was whether supplies of admission to ice skating rink and the hire of children’s ice skates – where sold as a package were single or multiple supplies. This is yet another separate/composite/compound supply case.

As a background to the issue please see previous relevant cases here here and here (in fact, this case was referred to in this hearing).

The issue of what is a single supply and what must be split as separate supplies seems to be neverending and HMRC appears to have an appetite to challenge every moot position through the courts.

Background

As anyone who has been ice skating will be aware (I tend to avoid the places not least as a result of not wishing to demonstrate my total lack of balance or skill) you can take your own skates, or hire skates for that session. In this case, the costs were £8 to use the rink or £10 with skate hire. The sole issue in the appeal was whether, when the appellants sold a “package deal” at £10 allowing a child to skate and to hire skates, it made a single supply or two separate supplies. If they made separate supplies, the £2 hire of skates to children is zero-rated. If it is a single supply the whole package is standard rated.

Decision

The judge decided that there were two separate supplies and that the skate hire supply could be treated as zero rated. This decision was based on a number of factors put forward by the appellant and which may be summarised as:

Skating with skate hire is a mixed supply, as the supply of skates is distinct and separate from the supply of admission
Around half the customers wishing to skate brought their own skates and some customers hired skates without paying to skate (at club sessions when a club had hired the rink and they needed skates for their club members). The hire of skates was therefore capable of being carved out from a single supply
A single “package” price is not determinative – in this case is it clear to the customer that they have freedom of choice and the components are available separately
Despite what HMRC said, it is clear that the skate hire is additional and optional
Neither supply is predominant and neither ancillary (as HMRC have previously accepted)
There was physical separation between the admission booth and the skate hire zone

The decision helpful included the following observations: “In our view… it is plain that in this case there are two supplies, a supply of the use of a skating rink and the supply of hire of ice skates. Neither is ancillary to the other as they both can be, and are, purchased on their own. Far from it being artificial to split the package into two, that is precisely what is in effect done in a substantial percentage of the appellant’s transactions with those using its facilities.” And “From the customers’ viewpoint a consumer of the package is getting the two things they want. The two elements are dissociable, not because of any spatial separation between the ticket office and the skate hire booth, but because that is the only appropriate way of looking at the supply of the elements.” And “…a substantial percentage of customers will choose to buy one or other of the element but not both, and that it is possible that the same customer may at one time buy a package and at another buy only one of the elements. Therefore it makes no sense to say that the elements are not dissociable when on a majority of the occasions that users enter the reception to use the rinks they choose only one of the two main elements, entry to the rink.”

Commentary

A sensible decision based on the facts. There does not seem to be an end to these types of cases as the decision is always based on the unique facts of each situation. It is difficult, if not impossible, to draft legislation which covers every type of scenario. Consequently, case law is very important in this area and the lead cases of CPP and Levob are the most cited. This case further illustrates that HMRC are not always correct in reaching a conclusion on multiple/composite supply cases and there is usually value in challenging their determinations. I would also say, from experience, that a review of a business’ activities can often identify such contentious areas and as always, getting it wrong can either result in an assessment and penalties, or mean that a business is paying too much VAT – not something that sits easily with me!

VAT due on property search fees? Whether they are disbursements

By Marcus Ward 25 September 2017

Latest from the courts – Brabners LLP

In the First Tier Tribunal case of Brabners LLP (Brabners) the issue was whether an external search agency used by the appellant correctly treated its supplies as VAT free, and if this was the case, whether the VAT free treatment continued to the appellant’s clients by way of a disbursement.

This is an interesting case and may create historic difficulties for conveyancing solicitors.

Background

Brabners is a law firm with a real estate department. It offers conveyancing services, both to buyers and sellers, in relation to proposed property transactions, for both commercial and residential property. In order to fulfil certain legal requirements, it used an external third party entity to obtain online property searches. The Appellant stated that it uses the online system for the majority of its searches (as opposed to a postal search carried out by employees of a Local authority, or a personal search at the Local Authority’s premises). The online search is not carried out by the Appellant, but rather, a specialist online search agency (‘Searchflow’) engaged by Brabners. Searchflow obtained the required property searches from the Local Authority’s digitised or dematerialised files and registers, and passed those results back to Brabners.

Searchflow invoiced the appellant for the cost of obtaining access to documents without the addition of VAT. Brabners treated this as a disbursement and invoiced its clients for the same amount without VAT.

The issues were:

Should the supply by the search agency be subject to output tax?
Was there a single or multiple supply?
Whether the charge to the end user of the services should be treated as a disbursement in respect of the search element
Which party consumed Searchflow’s services? (Brabners, or Brabners’ clients)

Note: the disbursement position is only (practically) relevant in this case if it was decided that the search fee was VAT free. Local Authorities now (from March 2017) charge VAT for searches, so the impact is only likely to impact on past situations.

Contentions

The main thrust of the Brabners’ argument is that the firm was requested, or expressly authorised, to obtain a search on the client’s behalf. Consequently, this meant that the firm was simply acting as the client’s agent, and the report belongs to the client. Brabners, argued that the search fees qualified as a disbursement for the purposes of VAT, and were not part of the otherwise taxable supply. It also argued that this separate treatment is intelligible and sensible. HMRC formed the view that the relevant payments cannot be treated as a disbursement as all the tests to do so were not met. For a guide to disbursements and the relevant tests please see here

Decision

The judge decided that the relevant expenses paid to Searchflow had been incurred by the appellant “in the course of making its own supply of services to” (its client) “and as part of the whole of the services rendered by it to” (its client). Therefore Brabners had consumed the service such that it could not be a disbursement. This point in this case proves academic as it was also, unsurprisingly, decided that Searchflow’s services were standard rated, so even if it were a disbursement, the VAT would still be payable by the appellant’s client.

Consequences

All firms which carry out conveyancing should review the VAT treatment of searches. If they have erroneously treated similar transactions as disbursements in the past, this is likely to require correction. Clearly, HMRC will be alive to this decision and it is anticipated that legal firms will be the subject of close inspection.

This case may also mean that third party search entities may be issuing retrospective VAT invoices or work which was previously treated as VAT free. This needs to be recognised and arrangements in place to recover any input tax incurred.

We are able to assist conveyancing firms with a review of the VAT position in light of this case.